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ABSTRACT 
Philosophical theories of the self differ about exactly which concerns, aims and 
insights best promote the discovery of their object. One unambiguous and effective 
criterion with which to evaluate any such theory, regardless of whatever other first 
principles or final commitments the theory may possess, is to consider its treatment of 
(and its constraints, if any, upon) how and to what extent the self can know itself. In this 
thesis, I aim to uncover the reasons why David Hume (1711-1776) and Edmund Husserl 
(1859-1938), for sometimes differing and sometimes similar reasons, limit the selfs 
ability to reflect upon and to know itself. I argue that the theories advanced by Hume and 
Husserl are best understood in combination with a model of self-perception that is 
compatible and complementary with the letter and spirit of their general philosophies and 
is also already implied inHume's bundle theory of the self. 
lll 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
This thesis would not have been realized without the guidance and continuing 
support of the Department ofPhilosophy at Memorial University ofNewfoundland and 
Labrador. I would like to thank the faculty of the Department of Philosophy at Memorial, 
present and retired. Their exemplary scholarship, excellent instruction and continued 
success in nurturing a culture of lively discussion within the department greatly enrich 
the fortunes of those who set upon the path of philosophy. In particular, I would like to 
thank the examiners of this thesis, Dr. Sean McGrath and Dr. Peter Trnka, for their 
careful analyses and thoughtful suggestions. I would also like to thank Dr. James 
Bradley, the Chair of Philosophy at Memorial. While acting as the supervisor of this 
thesis, and throughout the time I have known him in his capacity as professor, Dr. 




The general aim of this thesis is to determine the route by which, the means with 
which and the extent to which the self, in the theories advanced by Hume and Husser!, 
can come to know itself. In this Introduction, I shall indicate the central arguments and 
conclusions of the thesis. First, I shall discuss Chapter 1 in which I examine Hume' s 
bundle theory. Secondly, I shall discuss Chapter 2 in which I consider Husserl ' s theory of 
the self. Finally, I shall summarize the Conclusion in which I compare both theories. 
In Chapter 1, I present Hume' s bundle theory as a reply to substantivism or to the 
theory that the self is a simple and identical or, inHume's usage, changeless substance. 
Although Hume adeptly exposes many unexamined presumptions upon which 
substantivist claims rest, he remains curiously silent about two fundamental presumptions 
upon which his own bundle theory is founded. My primary aim in Chapter 1 is to analyse 
the nature of these presumptions and clarify their connections with the bundle theory 's 
more explicit commitments. 
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Hume's first presumption is that the self is what I shall call a discrete entity. 1 His 
second presumption is that the self has both an active and a passive aspect, i.e., that it is 
at once both the active bundling cause and the passive bundled effect of a succession of 
perceptions. In Book One of the Treatise, Hume aims to illuminate the passive aspect of 
the self and to emphasize the self s radical particularity as a passive heap of bundled 
perceptions. I argue, however, that Hume can be shown to appeal, both in Book One and 
indeed throughout the Treatise , to a conception ofthe self as an active entity, i.e., as a 
bundler ofperceptions.2 
My second aim in Chapter 1 is to examine Hume's claim that the self cannot 
perceive itself. I argue that in his denial of the self s ability to perceive itself, i.e., to 
1 I shall use 'discrete entity' to refer to an entity that is (i) finite in the quantity of its properties or parts, (ii) 
open to being both subdivided and fused together with other discrete entities, (iii) always incapable of 
knowing the nature or existence of other discrete entities and of knowing its relations with such entities (if 
indeed such entities exist), and (iv) separable in thought. I further develop this definition on pp. 3-4. 
2 Hume's appeal to the selfs active aspect in Book One of the Treatise is to be found, primarily, in his 
analysis of the habits of association that produce connections between the selfs perceptions. But Hume 
overlooks the way in which his associationist theory of how connections develop already presupposes the 
self to be active, i.e., as the associating center of all such connections. Further, this conception of the self as 
active appears antithetical to Hume's preferred and explicitly avowed conception of the self as a mere 
passive, atomistic bundle. Hume's tendency to emphasize the selfs passive aspect obscures the full extent 
to which the boundaries and connections between the selfs perceptive parts are, inHume's theory, 
structured by the binary economy of atomism and associationism. 
It should be noted that Hume's treatment of the passions and the imagination in Book II appeals to the 
selfs active aspect as well. But it is his theory of associationism which raises the stronger appeal and has 
the greater and more transformative impact on his bundle theory. Although the passions and the 
imagination play a key role in situating the self in a sphere of social and moral exchange, they do not, as 
Deleuze puts it, "determine the mind, do not impart a nature to the mind in the same way the principles of 
association do" (Gilles Deleuze, Desert Islands and Other Texts: 1953-1974, trans. Christopher Bush, et al. 
(Paris: Semiotext(e), 2004) 166). A survey of Book One alone, therefore, furnishes a discussion of Hume's 
appeal to the selfs active aspect. Moreover, Hume does little in Books Two and Three to counter the 
charge that this appeal always remains implicit or less than f011hright. 
While this thesis is intended to clarify Hume's appeal to both an active and a passive aspect of the self, it 
has as its more fundamental aim to uncover the nature of the relation between these aspects. In the 
Conclusion (see, especially, p. 79), I suggest that the nature of this relation is one of pre-established and 
ongoing co-dependency and co-determination such that neither the active nor the passive aspect of the self 
can, at any time, be fully separated or isolated from the other. For this reason, and others presented in the 
thesis, the two aspects are best understood as forming a discrete and inseparable unity. 
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perceive either the whole of itself or some identifiable part of itself, Hume appeals to 
some preconception about that which is entailed by self-perception, i.e., by the perception 
with which the self perceives itself. I analyse Hume's overall position to show how a 
model of self-perception, based upon the self's ability to perceive any one of its parts, is 
implied by and consistent with the bundle theory. I argue that this model sheds light on 
the connection between Hume's two presumptions, i.e., that the self is a discrete entity 
and that the self has both an active and a passive aspect. The model suggests that the 
selfs aspects are not themselves two discrete entities with no ability to introspect one 
another. Instead, the aspects are constitutive of one and the same discrete self. 
In Part I of Chapter 1, I examine Hume's critique of substantivism and refutation 
of eight substantivist claims. The claims are that the self is (i) simple, (ii) unified, (iii) 
identical, (iv) a substance, (v) an a priori form that is necessary for perception, (vi) an 
innate idea in the mind, (vii) self-evident and (viii) apodictic. In reply to (i) and (ii), 
Hume argues that while the self is finite it is neither simple nor indivisible. Rather, the 
self is a composite for which continual change is a reality and mereological division is a 
constant possibility. In reply to (iii), he claims that a succession of perceptions is 
constitutive of the self and that the self always undergoes change as a result of this 
succession among its perceptive parts. While Hume regards the illusory notion of the 
simple and identical self to be a fiction ofthe imagination, he holds that this notion is not 
arbitrary because the self is led by strong natural propensities to imagine and to believe in 
it, i.e., to form and to fix the notion in the mind. In response to (iv), he claims that various 
conceptions of a substance (i.e., substance qua a substratum, qua an onto logically 
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independent entity, and qua an entity in which parts inhere) all fail to correspond to the 
selfs nature. In response to (v), he argues that the self is not necessary for perception but 
that perceptions are instead necessary for the self as a bundle thereof. In reply to (vi), he 
denies the existence of innate ideas, claiming that all ideas derive from experience. In 
reply to (vii), he argues that the experience of a simple impression, i.e., the most basic 
form of perception, never warrants any claim which implicates a subject as the 
impression's percipient. Hume does not offer an explicit reply to (viii), but he would 
argue that since the self cannot be perceived (his own attempts to perceive it having 
apparently ended in failure3) the self can only be understood by observation and inference 
and not, therefore, by any means that can be plausibly viewed as 'apodictic.' Finally, at 
the end of Part I of Chapter 1, I analyse Hume's account of the nature of the selfs parts 
and their coming to be in the self.4 
In analysing the self, Hume forwards both an explicit and an implicit doctrine and 
it is between these two that various points of contention emerge. For example, although 
Hume claims that the self is constituted solely by the perceptions it encounters, he also 
3 The issue of whether Hume actually fails to perceive himself is controversial. Hume's claim that he 
cannot perceive himself is premised upon a preconception about what perceiving the self entails. But, this 
preconception, i.e. , that perceiving the self entails perceiving an unusual or rarefied object (instead of 
entailing the perception of any object whatever) is, I will argue, incongruous with the remainder of Hume's 
position. See pp. 32-36. 
4 Hume and Husserl 's theories ofthe self are, in general, premised upon some conception ofparthood 
relations. While different passages of their theories stress different mereological commitments, it is always 
a broad conception of parts and of wholes that prevails in their analyses. In the theories of the self advanced 
by Hume and Husserl, a 'part' may refer to anything which enters into the self's constitution (e.g., a 
perceived object, a perceptive act, a remembered or imagined event, a structure of human nature, etc.) and a 
'whole' may refer to either a mereologically-divisible structure in the self (e.g., a complex idea, a faculty, a 
law, etc.) or, alternatively, to the whole self as a comprehensive bundle (Hume) or absolute monad 
(Husserl). In accordance with this broad conception, I shall use the terms ' part' and 'whole' to indicate a 
constitutive relation where 'whole' refers to the constituted entity and ' pa1t' refers to the constituting or, 
with other entities of its kind, the co-constituting entity. I shall use 'aspect' to refer to a mereologically-
divisible entity that is identifiable both in terms of (i) the parts with which it is composed and (ii) the more 
extensive whole (e.g., discrete self) to which it is enjoined as a constitutive part. 
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implies that the self contains not only perceptions but also associations and, perhaps, 
various faculties (such as the imagination and the memory) and innate propensities.5 
Another point of contention is to be found in the conflict between, on the one hand, 
Hume's near exclusive emphasis on the conception of the self as a passive, bundled entity 
and, on the other hand, his analysis of dreamless sleep and death in which he suggests 
that the selfs ongoing existence depends no less upon the selfs active or bundling aspect 
than upon its passive or bundled aspect. In the brief passage in which he touches upon 
this issue, Hume focuses on the presence or absence ofthe selfs ongoing bundling 
activity as the sole criterion by which the succession of perceptions in ordinary 
experience can be distinguished from dreamless sleep or death. In many of the instances 
in which it arises, the bundle theory' s implicit doctrine takes on a foundational role as 
that upon which the theory's explicit doctrine rests. 
In Part II of Chapter 1, I examine some key objections against the bundle theory. I 
discuss Hume's use of the first person singular pronoun, ' I,' in the Treatise and examine 
the issue of whether Hume's analysis is self-contradictory. I consider two charges of self-
contradiction: (i) that Hume denies but also affirms that at least some parts of the self 
inhere in the self, and (ii) that Hume denies but also affirms that at least some parts of the 
self endure for at least some time. I argue that Hume can be defended against both 
charges. In response to (i), I point out that it is Hume's position that the self cannot know 
whether its parts exist only within itself or within other selves as well. As such, the self 
cannot decide whether its parts inhere solely in itself, in itself and in others, or in itself 
5 For Deleuze's view on why the faculties and propensities ought to be understood as bundles or sets of 
perceptions, see footnote on p. 19. 
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and in all other selves (i.e., in the case that all selves are copies of one another).6 In 
response to (ii), I argue that while Hume appeals to the endurance of at least some of the 
selfs parts, he does so without ever committing himself to the view that either the whole 
of the self or any number of the selfs parts are at all times changeless or identical. 
Drawing upon Hume's theatre analogy, I offer an analysis of how the selfs apparent 
endurance as a whole may be constituted out of a patchwork of short-lived and relative 
endurances, or perdurances/ that occur within and among the self's parts. 
In Part III of Chapter 1, I argue that Hume' s claim that he has failed to perceive 
himself presupposes a belief, on his part, about that in which not failing to perceive 
himself would consist. I explain how Hume's philosophy is consistent and compatible 
with a model that presents self-perception to be an act that is simple in content. If the self 
is discrete and, as a consequence, finite then both of the self's aspects must also be finite 
or limited in the quantity of parts that they contain. The self-perception in which these 
two finite aspects are linked need not entail the inclusion of either the full spectrum of the 
self's active bundling or the full collection of the self's passively bundled perceptions. I 
advance a case for why, according to the bundle theory, self-perception may best be 
understood to occur whenever the self perceives any one of its parts. In Hume's view, 
perceptions become parts of a self's constitution simply by being encountered by that 
self. To the extent that all real or encountered perceptions are parts of the self, all 
perceptions are self-perceptions. Further, according to this model, a self-perception can 
become thematic, i.e., known by the self to be an instance of self-perception, if the self 
6 For an analysis of what it is to inhere, see p. 14. 
7 See footnote on p. 26. 
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additionally perceives that the epistemic access of that which perceives (i.e., the selfs 
active aspect) to that which is perceived (i.e. , the selfs passive aspect) implies that the 
perceiving thing and the perceived thing (i.e., the two aspects) cannot themselves be 
discrete entities with no epistemic access to one another. Instead, the two are shown to be 
aspects of one and the same discrete entity. Finally, I explain why self-perception, 
conceived in this way, is a plausible criterion f?r selfhood and point out how the 
definition suggested by this analysis, i.e., the definition of the self as ' anything that 
perceives itself,' is consistent with the bundle theory' s explicit commitments. 
I begin Chapter 2 with an analysis of the route by which Husserl ' s 
phenomenology proposes to discover a rigorous, universal foundation for the sciences. I 
analyse his phenomenological method and his discovery ofthe self(or, more precisely, of 
the project of explicating the intentional exchange between the ego and its objects and the 
structures, situated in both, that facilitate this exchange) as this foundation. I examine his 
reasons for claiming that the self is solely responsible for the sense and constitution of 
objects. In Husser!' s view, the meanings that objects have for the self are only those 
meanings that the self has already intended or imposed upon them. Husser!, like Hume, 
seeks to understand objects simply as they are for the self that encounters them and not as 
they might be in themselves or in a mind-independent realm. Husser! claims that the self 
can be unfolded ad infinitum but, again like Hume, he limits the selfs ability to reflect 
upon its own innermost nature and thus to gain a comprehensive understanding of itself. 
Husser! holds that this epistemic limitation, by which the self cannot ever fully 
know itself, follows from two key phenomenological observations. First, he claims that 
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whenever an object is reflected upon, the object is presented within a structure called a 
horizon. This horizon precludes the reflective act from ever realizing more than a partial 
or incomplete presentation ofthe reflective object. Thus, according to Husserl, an 
immediate comprehensive understanding of any horizoned object, e.g., the self as a 
reflective object, is impossible. Second, Husserl claims that the innermost core of the 
self, i.e., the principle of functioning consciousness, is pre-temporal in nature and cannot 
be reified or reflected upon in any momentary act of thinking. As a result, Husserl 
presents the self s understanding of itself as being always inadequate or incomplete. 
Although it aims for knowledge of the self, Husserl's phenomenology never culminates 
in having fully achieved this goal. And as the prospect for a complete and comprehensive 
understanding of the self fades, the grounds upon which Husserl can base his claim that 
the self is the sole foundation of philosophy and the sciences (i.e., rather than being 
merely one of the many objects of these pursuits) become dubious if not untenable. 
In Part I of Chapter 2, I discuss Husserl's acceptance of the Cartesian meditating 
ego as the precondition and starting place of transcendental phenomenology. I examine 
the role of this ego in executing the epoche, i.e., the method through which the nai've 
realism of the natural attitude is suspended or bracketed and the selfs transcendental 
character is revealed. Finally, I evaluate the way in which the epoche enables Husserl to 
approach objects as the correlates, clues and direct outcomes of the selfs sense-giving 
processes. I argue that the self, as the foundation ofHusserl ' s phenomenology, has no 
foundation of its own, that it is, instead, a principle ' behind which one cannot go back 
any further. ' 
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In Part II of Chapter 2, I analyse Husser!' s theory of intentionality and in Part III 
of Chapter 2, I examine Husser! ' s conceptions of the self as an ego pole, life-stream, 
eidos ego and monad. I evaluate his view of the self as a changeless identical principle in 
contrast to the changing acts and objects of consciousness. I explicate his conception of 
the self as a life-stream or temporal flow of experience that confronts the self and enters 
into its constitution. I examine Husserl ' s notion ofthe eidos ego or the view of the self 
that is achieved through a process of abstracting from the particularities of the de facto 
ego in order to grasp the elements that are necessary for the constitution of any 
conceivable ego. Finally, I address Husserl's conception ofthe self as a monad, i.e., as 
the absolute constitutor and the absolute concretum of all reality and as the origin and end 
of all intentional exchange. 
In Part IV of Chapter 2, I examine Husser! ' s theory of inner time consciousness 
and focus specifically upon his claim that the self is unable to reflect adequately upon 
itself due to the fact that functioning consciousness is situated in a pre-temporal realm. I 
argue that Husser!' s view of functioning consciousness as the foundational core of the 
self prevents him from ever presenting functioning consciousness as a proper object 
which can in turn be analysed into still more fundamental parts (i.e., into pre-functioning 
or pre-conscious parts). He forecloses such an examination by limiting the selfs ability to 
perceive functioning consciousness and, thus, to perceive itself in general. I examine the 
two routes by which the self, according to Husser!, either already is or can become aware 
of itself. I argue that, in Husserl ' s account, neither pre-reflective self-awareness nor 
reflective self-awareness reveals the functioning core of the self. Thus, a comprehensive 
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understanding of the self is jeopardized if not foreclosed in his analysis. 
In the Conclusion of the thesis, I analyse the many similarities that obtain between 
the theories of the self forwarded by Hume and Husser!. I consider the extent to which 
each theory offers a reply to the dilemmas faced by the other and I offer a recapitulation 
of both theories in light of the specific model of self-perception that is implied, although 
denied in general terms, inHume's bundle theory. According to this model, the self 
realizes the most comprehensive perception that it can have of its own form or structure 
when it perceives that it can never perceive anything but itself or a part of itself, i.e., 
when it perceives itself to be a discrete and exclusively self-perceiving entity. Finally, I 
point out how Hume's analysis of the mind as a theatre of perceptions suggests the way 
in which the passive and active aspects are constitutive of a unified self: i.e., each aspect, 
like each actor inHume' s theatre of the mind, is what it is only in relation to the changes, 
endurances and other properties exhibited by the other aspect. Thus any distinction 
between the two aspects is founded in abstraction. 
A mark of any well-managed philosophical research undertaken at the Master' s 
level must surely be some diligence, on the part of the author, to clarify the very few 
problems that his or her research will confront directly and to specify the great many 
problems that are related to this research but must, both as a matter of good sense and 
necessity, be set aside as topics of future work. In the remainder of this Introduction, I 
offer two caveats about topics that will not be addressed. 
In this thesis, I shall set aside both the philosophies that inspired Hume and 
Husser! as well as the reception and legacy that the two enjoy among later thinkers. So 
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far as possible, I analyse their theories of the self within the context of their general 
philosophies and avoid the many disputes of interpretation arising in subsequent 
scholarship. Their theories contain deep complexities the analysis of which will not, I 
hope, leave the reader dissatisfied that commentators such as Kant, Hegel, Heidegger, 
Deleuze, etc. , have been given little or no voice here. The powerful insights offered by 
these commentators are very often infused with (and difficult, if not controversial, to 
separate from) equally powerful efforts to forward philosophical projects which, for the 
most part, are extraneous to the focus ofthis thesis, i.e. , to the theories ofthe self set out 
inHume and in Husser!. As such, their inclusion in a thesis of this scope cannot but be a 
matter of compromise. The path I have opted for in largely withholding these voices, 
except where literal but ingenious insights prevail, will, I hope, cast the theories before us 
in a clearer and more concentrated light. 
A second caveat concerns the extent to which I shall focus in this thesis on the 
reflections that the self can independently gather about itself. Far less emphasis will be 
placed on the sections inHume and Husser! which attend to other selves and to the 
secondary features ofthe self that are illuminated through its encounter with the 
intersubjective realm. Instead, the present thesis will pursue a prior and more 
fundamental course. There is ample textual evidence in both Hun1e and Husser! to 
support the view that their theories of the self take flight long before their critiques of 
self-other relations begin to surface. Their theories begin in a strikingly Cartesian fashion 
with the aim of analysing the self exclusively in terms of the resources already present 
within and internally available to it. In particular, the selfs private experience holds a 
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privileged position in their analyses as the sole means with which to uncover both the 
selfs general structure and its expansive content. Further, it is only in light of this prior 
and necessary first investigation ofthe self's understanding of itself through itself that 
concerns about the self's distinction from and possible relations with others emerge as 
well-defined problems open for subsequent research. In short, the investigation of the 
other and of the intersubjective realm in Hume and Husser I is premised on their prior 
investigation of the single self or ego. As such, their theories admit of a natural 
distinction between the portions that concern the self alone and those that concern the 
self's relations with others. It is perhaps for this reason that Hume and Husser! thought to 
place their theories of self-other relations under removed and separate headings. 8 In this 
thesis, I shall set aside the relations between the self, the other and the intersubjective 
realm as a topic for future research except in the infrequent case where touching upon 
these relations proves useful, or perhaps necessary, in illuminating the strictly ego-
centered or self-based approach to self-knowledge. If it is charged that I have analysed 
only a portion of the theories advanced by Hume and Husser!, I shall console myself with 
the fact that it will have been better to have analysed a portion than to have glossed over 
the whole. 
8 There is, however, one key respect in which the passages of Hume and Husserl considered in this thesis 
constrain their later claims upon se lf-other relations. Since the self only ever encounters perceptions (i.e., 
mental events) and since all encountered perceptions are, for Hume and Husser!, constitutive of that self 
which encounters them, it follows that the self only ever encounters others when (and to the extent that) it 
encounters its own parts. It is implied in the anti-realist tendency of Hume's empiricism and the 
transcendental character of Husser) 's phenomenology that the self can only, and at best, infer or imagine 
what other selves might be like on the basis of its own consititution. See footnote on p. 73. 
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CHAPTER 1 
TWO PRESUMPTIONS OF HUME'S BUNDLE THEORY 
INTRODUCTION 
During the years 1734-1737, while living in France and crafting his masterpiece, 
A Treatise of Human Nature, British empiricist David Hume (1711-1776) developed a 
reply to the question, 'What is the self? ' In his answer, which is usually referred to as the 
bundle theory of the self, Hume challenges the western metaphysical tradition of 
substantivism and, in particular, the substance theory of the self or the view of the self as 
a simple substance. Hurne's analysis centers upon a substantivist argument concerning 
the way in which the selfs changelessness (or, inHume's usage, its identity or identical 
endurance through time) follows from its simplicity. The argument holds that if the self is 
entirely simple in the special sense of being purely actual in disposition, then the self also 
lacks any potency for change and is changeless or identical. Rather than to dispute this 
argument, Hurne rejects substantivism by denying that the self is in any way simple or 
identical. He argues that the real self revealed by empirical investigation is nothing but a 
bundle of different perceptions, i.e., a complex and free-floating or substrate-less 
collection that is non-identical or mutable both when viewed as a whole as well as when 
one ventures to examine each of its parts individually. 
Hume's analysis is groundbreaking in two key respects. First, Hurne observes no 
distinction between the conscious percipient self and the perceptions that the self is 
commonly said to have or perceive. His tendency is to deny the self any existence beyond 
that of the successive perceptions ' it' encounters. Second, Hume imposes rigorous anti-
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realist constraints upon his bundle theory. For Hume, the self cannot be understood or 
identified in terms of its relations with other real, external and independent entities. 
Instead, the self must be self-referentially defined in terms of its internal properties (such 
as the parts that are constitutive of the self and the relations that obtain between these 
parts). The aim of this chapter is to explicate two key presumptions upon which Hume's 
anti-substantivist bundle theory rests. The first of these presumptions is that the self is 
what I shall call a discrete entity. An entity is discrete if it fulfills the following four 
criteria: 
(i) The entity must be ontologically finite, i.e. , it must never possess more 
or less than a proper subset of all possible properties (i.e., parts) at any 
one time; 
(ii) The entity must have a homogenous distribution of parts such that it is 
always conceivable that at some time the entity could be divided to 
produce two or more discrete entities or combined with one or more 
other discrete entities to produce a more extensive discrete entity; 1 
(iii) The entity must be epistemically closed or, to use Leibniz's term, 
windowless in two senses: 
1. The entity must have no internally situated clues from which 
facts about any other discrete entities can be derived (such as 
1 For further analysis of the setrs capacity to split into, and to be recombined with, autonomous self-
conscious sections, see Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 245-
274. 
3 
the facts of whether any or all other discrete entities contain 
none, some or all the same parts as it does);2 
11. The entity must have no outward epistemic access to other 
discrete entities or to the relations which obtain between itself 
and other discrete entities (if indeed such 'discrete entity-
discrete entity' relations exist); 
(iv) The entity must be separable in thought from other discrete entities, 
i.e., thinking of the entity must not require any antecedent, 
simultaneous or subsequent thought of any other discrete entity; 
Hume' s second presumption is that the self is possessed with both a passive and 
an active aspect, i.e., that the self is both an object in which changes upon changes are 
compounded and an activity that is responsible for those changes. This second 
presumption implies that the self as ' a bundle of different perceptions' is neither merely 
(i) a changing heap of bundled perceptions; nor (ii) a relatively changeless perception-
bundling activity (or a set of such perceptive activities). Rather, the self must be (iii) 
some combination of (i) and (ii). The self must be both the bundled concretum and the 
active bundler of all perceptions. Or, to put the matter in Cartesian terms, the self must be 
both the thoughts themselves and the thinking thing. Hume, however, never explicates 
the relation between these two aspects. In this chapter, I argue that it is in self-perception, 
2 According to Sorabj i, Porphyry forwarded a conception of the self as a "bundle of qualities that cannot be 
shared by any other individual" (Richard Sorabji, Self: Ancient and Modern Insights about Individuality, 
Life and Death (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2006), 45). Hume does not foreclose the 
possibility that different selves or bundles can share the same parts. He denies, however, that the self can 
gain any knowledge on this matter. 
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i.e., the perception in which the self perceives itself, that the two aspects are revealed to 
be not two discrete entities with no epistemic access to one another but, rather, to be 
aspects that subsist in and arise out of one and the same discrete entity. 
In Part I, I analyse Hume' s theory of perception and seek out the sceptical, 
empiricist and anti-realist constraints that inform the bundle theory. In Part II, I evaluate 
objections against the bundle theory and focus upon the issue of whether the bundle 
theory is self-contradictory. In Part III, I examine Hume's denial of self-perception or his 
"failure to introspect the self'3 as avowed the following claim: 
When l enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always 
stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold,-
light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch 
myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe 
any thing but the perception . 
I argue that Hume cannot meaningfully deny his own ability to perceive himself without 
holding some model of self-perception, i.e., without adopting some view of that in which 
self-perception consists. Finally, I argue that the bundle theory supports a model 
according to which the self perceives itself whenever the self perceives any of its parts. 
For Hume, the question, 'What is the self?' is a question of human nature. He 
understands human nature to be an empirical science, a science which was only 
3 A. E. Pitson, Hume 's Philosophy of The Self~ew York: Routledge, 2002), 19 
4 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge, revised by P.H. Nidditch, 2"d ed. 
(Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1978), 252. Cited hereafter as "T." 
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beginning to emerge at the time of his writing and which, he suspects, "will [in time] be 
much superior in utility to any other [presently existing science]" (T xix). In his view, 
knowledge of human nature is primary insofar as it forms a class of knowledge upon 
which all other knowledge depends (T xv). Although he prohibits metaphysical 
speculation about its foundations,5 he holds human nature to be open to legitimate 
empirical inquiry and suggests that the question of the self requires an inquiry into the 
deepest empirically examinable structures ofhuman nature.6 
In the Treatise, Hume presents the question of the self as the cardinal question of 
human nature. In Book One, Hume' s goal is to uncover the ontological structure of the 
self as a bundle of perceptions and to address the epistemological grounds for the self s 
claim to knowledge of itself. In Book Two, he investigates the self s role in feeling and, 
in Book Three, its role in moral action. 7 Hume holds Book One, i.e., its exegesis of the 
selfs causes, coming to be, constitution, capacities, etc., to be the standard against which 
the claims ofBooks Two and Three must be understood. In what follows, I focus on 
Book One of the Treatise (first published in 1739), and specifically on the section therein 
entitled, 'OfPersonal Identity,' and the relevant final passages ofHume's Appendix to 
the Treatise (first published in 1740). 
5 He claims, "any hypothesis [which] pretends to discover the ultimate original qualities of human nature, 
ought at first to be rejected as presumptuous and chimerical" (T xvii). 
6 He argues that, "there is no question in philosophy more abstruse than that concerning identity, and the 
nature of the uniting principle, which constitutes a person" (T 189). The term ' abstruse' must not be read as 
a pejorative or a forewarning that any inquiry into the question will be futile because Hume also claims 
that, " if truth be at all within the reach of human capacity [it is] certain it must lie very deep and abstruse" 
(T xiv). As the most abstruse of objects, knowledge of the self can be plausibly viewed as the foremost goal 
of Hume's philosophy. 
7 Hume distinguishes (i) the self qua thought, imagination and the understanding (Book One); and (ii) the 
self qua passions, sentiment and self-concern (Books Two and Three). Pitson calls (i) and (ii) the ' mental 
aspect' and the 'agency aspect' of the bundle theory, respectively. (A. E. Pitson, Hume 's Philosophy of The 
Self(New York: Routledge, 2002), 1). In this Chapter, I focus on the mental aspect of the theory. 
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According to the bundle theory that Hume espouses, the apparent simplicity and 
identity of the self is strictly fictional, this fiction is a product of the real self s 
imagination, and the real self, or mind, 8 is an ephemeral "bundle or collection of different 
perceptions" (T 252). But the bundle theory is founded on two presumptions, i.e. , that the 
self is discrete and that the self possesses two related but apparently distinct aspects as 
both an active bundler and a passive bundled heap of perceptions. These presumptions 
first take root in the preamble to the bundle theory, i.e. , inHume's critique of 
substantivism. 
PART I. THE ORIGIN AND AIMS OF THE BUNDLE THEORY 
Although the tradition connecting selfhood with substance is prefigured to some 
extent in the ancient Greek concept of the soul ('VDXTJ), an early and seminal figure in the 
modern substance theory of the self is Boethius ( 480-524) with his definition of the self 
as an "individual substance of a rational nature. "9 Rene Descartes ( 1596-1650) and 
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716) continue in this tradition with their claims that 
the self is a thinking substance (Descartes) and that the self is an indivisible, enduring and 
8 In Book One of the Treatise, "Hume uses person, self, soul, and mind as practically interchangeable" 
(Kenneth R. Merrill, Historical Dictionary of Hume 's Philosophy (USA: Scarecrow Press, 2008), 213). 
9 Leonard Geddes, "Person," The Catholic Encyclopaedia, Vol. II (New York: Robert Appleton Company, 
1911). 
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simple monad (Leibniz). In the Treatise , Hume identifies (T 251) and aims to undercut 
the following eight substantivist claims about the self: 
(i) The self is simple, indivisible and partless; 
(ii) The self is a unity or one in nun1ber; 
(iii) The self has a continuous or unbroken and identical or changeless 
endurance through time; 
(iv) The self is a substance in which non-independent parts inhere; 
(v) The self is an a priori form and condition for the possibility of 
• 10 perceptiOn; 
(vi) There is an innate idea of the self in the mind; 
(vii) The existence of a simple identical self is self-evident and given as such in 
the structure and content of ordinary sense experience; 
(viii) Knowledge of one' s own self is uniquely apodictic, certain or indubitable. 
Whereas claims (i) through (v) of this list are canonical for substantivism and 
concern the selfs ontology, claims (vi) through (viii) are secondary and concern its 
epistemological status. I shall address claims (i) through (vii) here and claim (viii), in 
relation to Hurne' s denial of self-perception, in Part III. Hume's general and explicit 
reply to the substantivists is that the self is neither a simple identical unity nor a 
necessary, a priori condition for the possibility of perception. Instead the self is a 
10 The weaker version of this claim is that some perceptions do not require a self(e.g., perception in 
animals and human infants). The stronger claim is that all perception requires a self. Hume's goal is to 
undermine claims of both varieties. 
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complex, non-identical and separable entity that is wholly constituted (a posteriori) by 
perceptions. 
Against the substantivist claim for the self's simplicity, a claim which is argued, 
for example, on the basis of the self's possession of only a strictly limited set of qualities 
which are themselves impenetrable to outside influence (c.f., the Leibnizian simple 
monad) or on the basis of the self's role as a content-less form of transcendental 
apperception ( c.f., the Kantian '!-think'), Hurne argues that the self is a vastly complex 
entity that is loose in constitution and can thus be separated, at least to some extent, into 
its constituent parts. 
It will be useful to consider Hume's account of perception in evaluating the nature 
of these parts. But before turning to this account, I wish to clarify a point of 
interpretation. In this thesis, I shall accept an interpretation ofHume's philosophy as one 
which forwards a type of moderate anti-realism that is based upon epistemological 
considerations about what the self can and cannot know. Hurne's anti-realism is 
'moderate' in the sense that his deep and abiding scepticism constrains his anti-realist 
tendencies and prevents him from ever raising any clear and unequivocal claim for or 
against the existence of independent entities. While there is an extensive tradition of 
interpreting Hume as a naturalist philosopher, 11 this tradition has a tendency to understate 
a central claim ofHurne' s system, i.e., the claim that realism, or the doctrine which holds 
mind-independent entities to exist, is an "absurdity" (T 188). This charge of absurdity is 
avowedly a one-blow critique of realism, but I take it to indicate Hume's consistent and 
11 For a leading account of this the naturalist interpretation, see Norman Kemp Smith, The Philosophy of 
David Hume (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005). 
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fundamental position on the matter. For Hume, the self is incapable of knowing the 
existence or nature of any external or independent entities. While it is outside the scope 
of this thesis adequately to ground the anti-realist interpretation, the aim of the thesis 
requires that at least some such interpretation ofHume' s philosophy be explored. While 
failing to accept any interpretation precludes any positive resolution ofHume' s views on 
the self, accepting an interpretation (e.g., a naturalist or anti-realist interpretation) casts 
the bundle theory in a set of definite boundaries and contours that can be clarified and 
explicated. For example, the anti-realist interpretation suggests that the self is, as Merrill 
puts it, "never directly or immediately aware of independent, external objects." 12 All 
experience is thus experience of perceptions, i.e., of immediate internal mental events. 
Hume appears to accept this conclusion and claims that perception is the "narrow 
compass" (T 68) of the mind. In his view, perception is the matter with which the self is 
constituted and the form of all the selfs conscious acts. Proceeding with this anti-realist 
interpretation, I shall now analyse Hume' s theory of perception and, thereby, further 
clarify his view of the self as a bundle of perceptions. 
Hume distinguishes two types of perception, i.e. , impressions and ideas, and 
divides these into simple and complex varieties. Simple impressions are the distinct, 
independent, lively, fleeting and irreducible or fully separate atoms of sensory 
experience. They are the first perceptions to be encountered by the self in its genesis and 
formation. Each simple impression is a partless unity that contains no subject-affirming 
content. As such, simple impressions, e.g., a patch of blue, never warrant a claim for the 
12 Kenneth R. Merrill, Historical Dictionary of Hume 's Philosophy (USA: Scarecrow Press, 2008), 146. 
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existence of a percipient, e.g., 'the patch of blue is a patch of blue for me,' 'I have the 
patch of blue,' ' the patch ofblue is mine,' etc. The patch of blue is subjectless, an 
absolute simplicity out of which no further content can be factored. 
Simple ideas are the less-lively copies that derive from, depend upon and 'exactly 
represent' antecedent simple impressions. Impressions of reflection are complex, 
generated through the mind's activity upon antecedent ideas and separable into simple 
impressions. Complex ideas are produced by the associating activity of the mind and are 
separable into distinct simple ideas. It is Burne's general view that ideas are never 
innate. 13 Barring a few exceptional cases, ideas are always (i) the product of a posteriori 
simple impressions, and (ii) either simple and fully separate or complex and further 
separable. 
Hume claims that in the course of our ordinary experience subsequent perceptions 
succeed upon antecedent ones "with an inconceivable rapidity" (T 252). Emphasizing the 
selfs passive aspect as a heap of bundled perceptions, he claims that the self is 
constituted by "successive perceptions only" (T 253). The succession of antecedent to 
subsequent perceptions implies that the self is always undergoing "incessant changes of 
its parts" (T 261). 14 While our experience is characterized by a succession among our 
perceptions, Hume is careful to specify that no underlying self or percipient can be 
derived from this succession. The succession is, as Deleuze puts it, "not the affection of 
13 Hume claims that "every idea is derived from preceding impressions" (T 633). 
14 Hume's analysis raises a central question: 'Does each change in perception entail that an enduring self is 
in part changed or, alternatively, that an anterior self is replaced by a subsequent one?' He appears to 
support the view that change entails replacement, i.e., that a thing cannot both change and continue to be 
what it had been prior to the change. 1 return to Hume's views on this matter, which are more complicated 
than they appear, on pp. 25-26. 
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an implicated subject, nor the modification or mode of a substance." 15 The self does not 
exist prior to but only in synchronicity with the succession and it neither underlies nor 
exists apart or "distinct from its perceptions." 16 Essentially, the distinction between the 
self and its perceptions is specious: the self is perceptions. 17 Hume's use of the term 
'perception,' however, implicates both a process of perceiving and a thing perceived and 
it is in light ofboth ofthese senses that Hume's theory ofthe self as a bundle of 
perceptions must be understood. 
In Hume' s view, the self is not an a priori form that is necessary for some or all 
types of perception. Rather, it is a posteriori perceptions that are necessary for the 
coming to be of the self. But a key distinction obtains between that which may constitute 
the self generally and that which actually constitutes a de facto self. The bundle theory 
implies that a particular self is not a bundle of just any perceptions but of only those 
particular perceptions the self has encountered in the past and now encounters in the 
present. These past and present perceptions and their realized modifications in the self are 
both sufficient and necessary for the selfs present constitution. But since Hume holds the 
self to be nothing but the perceptions it encounters, the selfs contingency on its 
perceptions is trivial Gust as the existence of a thing is trivially contingent upon that same 
thing's existence). The relevant non-trivial necessity implied by Hume is that each self 
15 Gilles De leuze, Empiricism and Subjectivity: an Essay on Hume 's Theory of Human Nature, trans. 
Constantin V. Boundas (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 88. 
16 A. E. Pitson, Hume 's Philosophy of The Self (New York: Routledge, 2002), 2 1. 
17 Deleuze claims, " the given is no longer given to a subject, rather, the subject constitutes itself in the 
given" (Gilles Deleuze, Empiricism and Subjectivity: an Essay on Hume 's Theory of Human Nature, trans. 
Constantin V. Boundas (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 87). 
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must have some perceptions, not that each must have such-and-such perceptions in 
particular. 
Hume claims that the self fails to conform to any of the following three notions of 
a substance: substance, (i) as a hidden substratum, (ii) as an ontologically independent 
entity (i.e., an entity the existence of which does not depend upon the existence of any 
other entity), and (iii) as an entity in which parts inhere. First, following Locke, Hume 
doubts the clarity and empirical grounds of the notion of a hidden substratum, i.e., of a 
bearer of properties which does not itself appear anywhere among the properties it bears. 
A genuine idea of a hidden or impression-less thing is impossible, Hume argues, because 
ideas are always derived from impressions and it is inconceivable that an impression 
could ever give rise to the idea of an impressionless entity. Thus we have no idea of a 
substratum for such an idea would be "very difficult, if not impossible, to be conceiv' d" 
(T 232-233). We have, rather, only the illusory, unclear and empirically unfounded 
notion of it. The self, as a real object of empirical research, is not a substance qua 
substratum. 
Secondly, Hume disputes the conception of the self as an ontologically 
independent substance. He claims, "all our perceptions [ . .. ] may exist separately, and 
have no need of any thing else to support their existence. They are, therefore, substances, 
as far as this definition explains a substance" (T 233). InHume's view, perceptions do 
not depend upon the self for their existence. However, he suggests that the self, like all 
other composite entities, does depend upon the distinct and fully separate parts out of 
which it is constituted. Thus the self is not onto logically independent but contingent upon 
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its particular perceptions. But, as noted above, this contingency is trivial because the 
distinction between the self and such perceptions is specious. Hume is content to argue 
that the self is not, as traditionally conceived, ontologically independent in relation to 
perceptions which ontologically depend upon it. The self is not an onto logically 
independent substance. 
Finally, Hume denies that the self is a substance qua ground in which particular 
parts inhere. Inherence or inhesion is the relation typically held to obtain between 
' substance' and 'accident' but also between 'whole' and 'part', 'subject' and 'predicate' , 
' time' and 'event', 'form' and ' instance', ' type' and 'token', etc. In each case, the latter is 
held to inhere in the former of the pair. I would analyse the concept of inhesion as 
follows. The claim 'x inheres iny' means that: 
(i) x is onto logically dependent upon y, i.e., the existence of y is a 
necessary condition for the existence of another entity, x; 
(ii) x belongs to y (i.e., xis y's own, or x is y's possession); 
(iii) x fulfils (i) and (ii) in precisely the same way as anything else that 
inheres iny. 18 
According to one formulation of substantivism, perceptions inhere in the self. Hume 
dismisses the notion of inhesion as impressionless and claims that perceptions, as 
ontologically independent entities, must be explained without appeal to some further 
thing in which they inhere. Thus the notion of inhesion performs no work in the exegesis 
18 Applied to the context of the self, a particular perception, p, inheres in the self if p is onto logically 
dependent on the self, p is the selfs own, and p is ontologically dependent on the self and is the selfs own 
in precisely the same way (univocally) as anything else that inheres in the self. 
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of the real self or, indeed, in that of any empirical phenomenon. The self does not inhere 
in perceptions and perceptions do not inhere in it: the self and its perceptions are one and 
the same. Therefore, the self is not a substance in which perceptions inhere. 
Hume accepts that we commonly presume ourselves to be essentially the same or 
identical through time. Arguing that this conception of the self is illusory, Hume attempts 
to uncover the original impression(s) from which the conception is derived. But this 
reduction ends empty-handed: no impression(s) can be found of which the simple 
identical self is a copy. Hume concludes that "there is no such idea" of the self as a 
simple identical entity (T 252). Rather, there is only an impressionless notion "to which 
our several impressions and ideas are suppos 'd to have a reference" (T 251 ). But if the 
notion of a simple identical self neither derives from any a posteriori impression nor 
exists innate or a priori in the mind, then from whence does it arise? Hume argues that 
the innate propensities of human nature are responsible for the formation and presence of 
the notion in the mind. 
Hume claims that whenever it surveys a series of diverse but related objects, the 
self has a natural propensity to "substitute the notion of identity" (T 254) and thereby to 
mistake a genuine diversity of objects to be the continuous parts or convertible aspects of 
one and the same entity. The imagination then "feign[s] some new and unintelligible 
principle, that connects the objects together, and prevents their interruption or variation" 
(T 254). Ultimately, "all objects, to which we ascribe identity [ .. . ] consist of a succession 
of related [but distinct] objects" (T 255). While all identity claims are thus groundless, 
our belief in the identity of objects is not. The mind has a propensity, (i) to draw 
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connections or associations (of resemblance, contiguity in space and time, and cause and 
effect) between distinct perceptions, and (ii) to affirm that these mind-generated 
associations are in fact necessary, law governed relations that obtain in an ontologically 
independent and external world. While these propensities neither clarify our reasoning 
nor accurately represent our experience, they are too powerful to be at all times dispelled 
by reason. Hume admits to believing in his own simplicity and identity except when fixed 
upon philosophical concerns. The peculiar belief in one's simplicity and identity is 
common and pervasive, inHume's view, because it is encouraged by strong natural 
propensities and not, as substantivists allege, because the selfs simplicity and identity are 
in some way self-evident and would be recognized as such by any disinterested rational 
observer. Hume thus undermines the illusory notion of the simple identical self. 
Hume offers two key metaphors of the bundled, complex, changing and real self. 
First, he compares the self to "a kind of theatre," and denies that we have any "notion of 
the place, where these scenes [i.e., parts of the play] are represented" (T 253). The 
suggestion here is that each self has some conception of the succession of its own 
perceptions but no clear conception of the self as a fixed and independent structure that 
contains or facilitates this succession. The self, so far as we know, contains no constant 
structure against which the change within and among its parts can be rigorously and 
objectively measured. Second, Hume compares the self to a commonwealth, claiming 
that, "the same individual republic may not only change its members, but also its laws 
and constitutions; in like manner the same person may vary his character and disposition, 
as well as his impressions and ideas, without losing his identity" (T 261). Although 
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Hume's aim in presenting this metaphor is to discredit the substantivist claim for the 
selfs unbroken identity, the commonwealth metaphor also suggests that the self is 
something into which and out of which parts both can and do pass. Although we have no 
notion of the self as a fixed container, we entertain a conception of the self as both a 
finite, or limited in its parts, and open entity for which the introduction of new parts, e.g., 
novel perceptions, is always possible. 
Although these metaphors are somewhat illuminating, Hume provides a more 
direct answer to the question of how, i.e. , by what parts and processes, the self is 
constituted. He claims that the self is a "system or train of different perceptions [ ... ] all 
united together but without any perfect simplicity or identity" (T 657). 19 But are we here 
to understand that the parts of the self are (i) different from one another, or (ii) unified 
with one another, or (iii) somehow fixed between difference and unity? Mereological 
questions, such as the following, shed some light on Hume's account: 
(i) Do I have any unchanging parts which establish and preserve my identity; 
(ii) Can I exist without my present parts; 
(iii) Can I exist without any parts; 
(iv) Can my present parts exist independent of me; 
(v) Can my present parts exist independent of all bundles; 
(vi) Do parts exist independent of me, i.e., am I a mere collection of some 
parts; and 
(vii) Do parts only exist in me, i.e., am I a complete collection of all parts? 
19 The emphasis is mine. 
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If 'parts' are defined as 'perceptions,' then Hume' s explicit reply to (i) through (iii) is 
negative, (iv) through (v) is affirmative and he claims to be agnostic vis-a-vis (vi) and 
(vii). But perhaps the self ofHurne' s system contains more than perceptions alone, i.e., it 
contains parts of more than one type. It seems reasonable to expect that associations 
should count as parts of the self because, for Hurne, associations are products ofthe selfs 
activity upon perceptions?0 The parts of the self may also include the natural propensities 
that Hurne invokes in his account of how the self comes to believe itself to be simple and 
identical. 
Hume faces additional mereological questions over the temporality of the selfs 
parts. De leuze argues that the self s gathering of parts over time undercuts any 
conception of the self as a mere "sum of its parts [because] the parts, considered together, 
are defined, rather, according to their mode of temporal, and sometimes spatial, 
appearance. "21 But, even if the self s perceptions conform to a temporal order or de facto 
sequence, we have no greater reason to count than to discount this temporal order as but 
another type of part which comes to be within the self. If the temporal order of 
perceptions is such a part, our conception of the self as the sum of its parts remains 
tenable. Another key mereological question centers on the extent to which the self 
20 There is, however, some controversy over the extent to which Hume allows for a distinction between 
perceptions and associations. Associations can be viewed as complex ideas (i.e., as a species of perception) 
or, alternatively, as non-perceptive relations between perceptions. But, a distinction between perceptions 
and associations is warranted insofar as Hume claims that simple impressions (i.e., the genealogical 
ancestors of all other perceptions) are unknowable in causal origin. Associations, on the other hand, are 
always the product of the selfs power to effect relations between its parts. 
2 1 Gilles Deleuze, Desert Islands and Other Texts: /953-1974, trans. Christopher Bush, et al. (Paris: 
Semiotext(e), 2004), 94. 
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"transposes and changes" (T 10) its parts over time, i.e., on whether the selfs parts 
remain separable, like a mixture of coarse minerals, or whether they ever become 
synthesized in the self into an inseparable, solution-like unity. 
Hume goes some way toward deciding these disputes but compromises all such 
efforts in the Appendix of his Treatise where he casts formidable doubt upon the bundle 
theory.22 According to the analysis presented in Book One at least, the selfs parts are 
never synthesized into a homogeneous unity. Although "never very fixed nor 
determinate" (T 189-190) the self s ever-changing constitution remains divisible, at least 
to some extent, into its parts. In addition to perceptions, associations, natural propensities 
and the temporal order with which each arise in the mind, we may also have to count the 
various faculties such as the imagination and the memory as parts of the self.23 We may 
continue to accept that the self is a bundle, but we cannot, without further argument and 
interpretation, maintain that the self is a bundle of perceptions alone. 
Of all the parts that the self contains, Hume holds the memory, or the "faculty by 
which we raise up the images of past perceptions" (T 260), to play a key role in the selfs 
coming to be. In his account of perception, the memory is responsible for retaining each 
impression as it comes to be a simple idea and each simple idea as it comes to be a 
22 In the Appendix, Hume largely retracts the bundle theory' s positive claims and reappropriates a kind of 
agnosticism about the selfs nature that is reminiscent of the hopeful but epistemically-sober mood of the 
Treatise's Introduction. This ascetic retreat is exemplary of Hume's scepticism and his readiness to reform, 
censure or abandon any claim that steps beyond his empirical analysis of the tendencies and exceptions that 
inform his own experience. 
23 According to Deleuze, however, the propensities and faculties should be viewed not as real wholes but as 
sets of perceptions. Under this conception, the propensities and the faculties are analogous to the self as a 
loose bundle of perceptions. He claims, "we use the terms ' imagination' and ' mind' not to designate a 
faculty or a principle of organization, but rather a particular set or a particular collection [i.e., of 
perceptions]" (Gilles De leuze, Empiricism and Subjectivity: an Essay on Hume 's Theory of Human Nature, 
trans. Constantin V. Boundas (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 87). 
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complex one? 4 But the memory is, inHume's view, fallible, full of gaps and complicit in 
the dubious inventions issuing from the imagination. For example, he claims that in our 
mistaken claim to an unchanging personal identity we often overstep the resources of 
memory and imagine ourselves to have endured at times and in places the details of 
which we are presently unable to recall. The gaps and imperfections of memory are 
concealed by the causal associations that link the retrievable sections of memory 
together. Thus, as Merrill puts it, causal associations are the only source "of objects and 
events lying beyond immediate perception or memory."25 Hume claims: 
Had we no memory, we never should have any notion of 
causation, nor consequently of that chain of causes and effects, 
which constitute our self or person. But having once acquired 
this notion of causation from the memory, we can extend the 
same chain of causes, and consequently the identity of our 
persons beyond our memory, and can comprehend times, and 
circumstances, and actions, which we have entirely forgot, but 
suppose in general to have existed (T 262) 
Memory is thus necessary but not sufficient for the illusion of the simple self. The 
illusion is sustained "by the relation of cause and effect" (T 261). We should not, 
however, conclude that Hume invokes causal relations only in the coming to be of the 
illusory notion of the self as a simple and identical entity. 
24 On the formation of ideas, H ume claims, "ideas are derived from something antecedently present to the 
mind" (T 67). 
25 Kenneth R. Merrill, Historical Dictionary of Hume 's Philosophy (USA: Scarecrow Press, 2008), 69. 
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Hume's analysis of causality illuminates two types of causal relations in the mind. 
The first are the dubitable associations which are produced by the mind (e.g., the first 
billiard ball collides with and causes a second, previously stationary, billiard ball to 
move). Hume famously doubts whether such associations correspond to any mind 
independent causal relations between objects in the world. The second type of causal 
relations which must, by contrast, be held to be real and true as a result of the existence of 
the first type, is the causal relation that obtains between the mind and the associations it 
produces (e.g., the mind generates or causes itself to have the association according to 
which the billiard balls are causally related). Thus Hume does not deny causal relations in 
the mind. He denies, rather, any epistemic grounds upon which to decide whether any 
external, mind-independent causal relations exist. 
There are two ways in which the self, inHume's analysis, acts as a cause: it acts, 
(i) as a cause of the nature of its ongoing perceptions, and (ii) as the cause of itself. 
Although Hume claims that we do not know the origin of simple impressions (i.e., 
whether they arise from the mind, the sense organs or some other cause), he claims that 
we do know that simple impressions are followed by simple ideas, complex impressions 
and complex ideas. We also know that the particular instances of the latter three species 
of perception are in some way caused by the very self that encounters them. The higher 
forms of perception are only possible for a self that is active in retaining and transforming 
its impressions into ideas and in drawing these elements together into complex ideas and 
complex impressions. The self is a cause, therefore, insofar as it determines the ideality 
and complexity of its own subsequent higher perceptions. 
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Second, the self acts as a cause of itself, i.e., as the fait accompli of its own 
activity, and as "that which develops itself'26 without any premeditated plan to do so. The 
self acts as the cause of itself in two ways. First, the self acts as the de facto cause of 
itself by determining the ideality and complexity of its own perceptions, as noted above. 
Second, the self acts as the de jure cause of itself insofar as all other self-independent 
causes are excluded in advance as 'absurd.' If, as Hume maintains, the realist claim for 
external, independent entities is absurd then so too must be the claims that (i) external, 
independent causes can bring about effects (including effects in the self); and that, (ii) the 
self can bring about effects in external, independent objects. Thus, in every causal 
association, the terms ' cause' and ' effect' will either refer to the self or to a part of the 
self, such as one of the self s perceptions, or else Hume will have to hold that the causal 
association in question is absurd or untenable. If pressed on the issue of what causes the 
self, however, Hume would likely claim that perhaps there are absurd external causes and 
effects of the self. But, in the same sceptical key, he would likely add that he, or broadly 
speaking, the self, could not know anything about such entities even if, by some absurd 
power, they happen to exist. 
26 Gilles De leuze, Empiricism and Subjectivity: an Essay on Hume 's Theory of Human Nature, trans. 
Constantin V. Boundas (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 85. 
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PART II. CRITICISMS AND DEFENCE OF THE BUNDLE THEORY 
In this Part, I shall examine the role ofHume' s use of the first person singular 
pronoun, ' I,' in the Treatise. Second, I shall analyse the way in which he appears to be 
exposed to two counts of self-contradiction. First, Hume seems to deny but also 
implicitly to affirm that at least some ofthe selfs parts, (e.g., the higher perceptions, all 
associations, the imagination, the memory, natural propensities, etc.) inhere in the self. 
Second, he seems to deny but implicitly to affirm that at least some part(s) of the self 
endures through time. I argue that the bundle theory can be defended against both 
charges. 
Hume' s arguments, including those he offers against the simple enduring self, are 
sceptical in spirit. But, as Chisholm has argued,27 Hume's scepticism wholly depends 
upon an appeal to some conception ofthe pronoun, '1. ' Chisholm draws a logical 
distinction between that which follows from, (i) finding a proposition to be true; and (ii) 
failing to find whether a proposition is true or false. He claims: 
27 See Roderick M. Chisholm, "On the Observability of the Self," Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research, Vol. 30, No. I (Sep., 1969): 7-21 . 
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The fact that a man finds a certain proposition p to be true does 
warrant a subjectless report to the effect that p is true. For 
finding that p is true entails that p is true. [But, conversely,] 
one's failure to find that q is true entails nothing about the truth 
of q. The fact that a man fails to find that q is true entitles him to 
say only that he, at least, does not find that q is true. 28 
To apply Chisholm' s distinction to Hume's case, consider Hume' s following 
claim: (i) "I do not think there are any two distinct impressions, which are inseparably 
conjoin'd" (T 66). Ifthe pronoun, 'I,' were removed, (i) may be rephrased as follows: 
(ii), 'there are no two distinct impressions which are inseparably conjoined. ' The 
difference between (i) and (ii) is that (i) addresses Hume's beliefs about impressions, and 
only indirectly addresses impressions themselves, whereas (ii) addresses impressions 
themselves (quite apart from Hume's beliefs about them). The first of these, (i), is 
sceptical in a way that the second, (ii), is not. Although Chisholm' s analysis does not take 
the form of an objection, it presses a central question. The question is not whether Hume 
appeals to a conception of the 'I' or self, but to what conception he appeals. 29 Most 
importantly, does Hume commit himselfto a view ofthe self as a simple and identical 
entity? It is clear that Hume rejects the view of the self as simple: the self, for Hume, is 
28 Ibid., II. 
29 1 am supposing that by 'I ' Hume refers to some conception of himself. It would be absurd to suppose that 
Hume used 'I' throughout the Treatise to refer to something other than himself, e.g., to refer to Newton 's 
concept of gravity. If Hume uses 'I ' to refer to himself, and appeals to some conception of himself in doing 
so, then it seems that there are three key possibilities. First, if Hume's argument against the simple 
enduring self appeals to a simple enduring self, his argument is self-contradictory. Second, if Hume's 
argument against the simple enduring self appeals to some other conception of the self, his argument is not 
self-contradictory. But if, third, his argument f or a complex discontinuous self appeals to a complex 
discontinuous self argument, then his argument is circular. 
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nothing if not a complex of parts. However, the question of whether he appeals to a 
conception of the self as an identical or changeless entity requires further consideration. 
It remains to be determined whether Hume conceives the self to be (i) identical, or 
(ii) ever-changing (not identical but in some sense enduring), or (iii) ever-replaced 
(neither identical nor enduring). Throughout the Treatise, Hume appeals to a conception 
of the self as an enduring entity. For example, Hume' s account of the transformation of 
perceptions of one species into another (e.g. of simple impressions into simple ideas) 
presupposes that something in the self endures at least while this transformation is 
realized and to the extent that it is realized. Another example is Burne's claim that, 
"when I am convinced of any principle, it is only an idea, which strikes more strongly 
upon me. When I give the preference to one set of arguments above another, I do nothing 
but decide from my feeling concerning the superiority oftheir influence" (T 103). In 
claiming to decide on the basis of antecedent feelings, Hume appeals to a self which 
possesses at least some modicum of enduring parts. This appeal, however, appears 
incompatible with his claim that there is no "single power of the soul, which remains 
unalterably the same, perhaps for one moment" (T 253).30 But if the self never remains 
unchanged in whole or in part, if none of its properties are fixed even for a moment, why 
is it that all new associations seem to be invariably cast in the form of being an 
association of resemblance, contiguity or causality? If the self is in continual and all-
encompassing flux, how does the faculty of memory retain any portion of its memory-
30 The emphasis is mine. 
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contents over time? The constancy of such powers seems to imply a real endurance in the 
self. 
Hume's claim, however, is not that the self always changes but that it perhaps 
always does. The self experiences change; but, for reasons which I shall discuss in Part 
III, 31 the self cannot survey all its parts at once in an effort to determine whether all its 
parts have changed or whether some of its parts remain unchanged (if only momentarily). 
Further complicating the selfs ability to perceive change within its parts, Hume's theatre 
metaphor suggests that the parts of the self exhibit change not in isolation of one another 
but only in relation to one another, i.e., that the change taking place within one part is 
appreciable and measurable only in comparison to the stability or endurance taking place 
within some other part. As such, change and endurance appear to be, inHume's analysis, 
relative phenomena. Although Hume does not fully explore the possibility, the selfs 
endurance through time, rather than being based upon the existence of changeless parts in 
the self, might instead be based upon the selfs bundling of all the momentary relative 
endurances which occur among its parts. The selfs conflicting feelings about, on the one 
hand, its endless dynamism and, on the other hand, its unbroken identity might be an 
effect of the fact that the selfs endurance, or perhaps its perdurance,32 is like a long rope 
composed of only short threads such that the absolute changeless identity of the whole 
31 See pp. 34-35. 
32 Blackburn defines perdurance as follows: "something perdures if and only if it persists by having 
different temporal parts, or stages, at different times, though no one part of it is wholly present at more than 
one time[ ... ] perdurance corresponds to the way a play is extended in time: Act I is not present when Act 
If is" (Simon Blackwell, "Perdurance," The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, 2"d ed. (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2008). 
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self is indeed illusory and fictitious but the concrete endurance of the whole, as a 
temporal patchwork of shorter relative endurances, is real. 
It has been argued that the ability of the self, in Hurne' s account, to perceive a 
change among its perceptions, i.e., its experience of a "real perceptual succession,"33 
implies an identical percipient, at least while the perceived change is ongoing. The idea 
here is that change can only be measured by or in relation to something that is fixed or 
changeless.34 As Campbell puts it, "if event B is cognized as sequent upon event A, 
clearly A must in some form be present to the same [i.e., identical] subject as that to 
which B is present."35 Although Hume does not adequately counter this objection, he 
appears to possess the resources to do so. If change and endurance are, as Hume suggests, 
only experienced as relational phenomena, then the selfs perception of a perceptual 
succession need not require the self to contain any permanent or unchanging parts. It 
might be the case that the part of the self that perceives change is not itself permanent or 
eternally unchanging but only a thing which exhibits a relative stability or endurance in 
relation to the perceived change (and perhaps only exhibits these qualities while the 
perceived change is ongoing). In any case, Hume does not commit himself to the view 
that either the whole self or any part of the self is forever identical. Thus the bundle 
theory is not self-contradictory on this point. 
But does Hume hold that parts of the self inhere in the self? His account of the 
faculty of memory appears committed to this substantivist doctrine. We generally 
33 Abraham Sesshu Roth, "What was Hume's Problem with Personal Identity?" Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research, Vol. 61 , No. I (Jul. , 2000): 94. 
34 See D. G. C. McNabb, David Hume: His Theory of Knowledge and Morality (Aidershot, England: Gregg 
Revivals, 1992), 149-150. 
35 C. A. Campbell, On Seljhood and Godhood (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1957), 75-76. 
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suppose that the existence of a particular memory implies the existence of a particular 
self, i.e., the very self for whom the memory is a memory. But Hume denies, at least 
implicitly, that we can know whether other mereologically equivalent bundles exist that 
contain the same parts, e.g., the same memories, as ourselves. While a self may call a 
memory 'its own,' the self cannot know whether memories, associations, perceptions, 
propensities, etc. inhere in itself or not. Thus Hume's bundle theory is not self-
contradictory on this point either. He does not presuppose or contend that parts of the self 
can be known by the self to inhere in the self. Hume has thus countered the charges that 
the bundle theory is self-contradictory on the issue of the self s supposed identity and on 
the issue of the supposed inherence of the self s parts. 
Hume claims that his scepticism enforces "a diffidence and modesty in all my 
decisions" (T 633). For an example of this modesty, consider Hume's claim that he can 
only settle his own nature and not the nature of all selves at all times: "if any one [ ... ] has 
a different notion of himself [ .. . ] all I can allow him is, that he may be in the right as well 
as I, and that we are essentially different in this particular" (T 252).36 Here Hume is 
engaged in the presumption that the self is a discrete entity, i.e., an entity that stands in 
epistemic separation from others of its kind. Nowhere is this presumption, which informs 
all Hume's arguments for and against various other properties of the self, more clearly 
present than in his analysis of dreamless sleep and of death: 
36 
c. f. Locke's avowal, "I think the intellectual faculties are made and operate alike in most men. But if it 
should happen not to be so, I can only make it my humble request, in my own name and in the name of 
those that are of my size, who find their minds work, reason, and know in the same low way that mine 
does, that the men of a more happy genius will show us the way of their nobler flights" (John Locke, 
"Second Letter to Bishop of Worchester," An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2008), 467). 
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When my perceptions are removed for any time, as by sound 
sleep; so long am I insensible of myself, and may truly be said 
not to exist. And were all my perceptions removed by death, and 
could I neither think, nor feel, nor see, nor love, nor hate after 
the dissolution of my body, I should be entirely annihilated, nor 
do I conceive what is farther requisite to make me a perfect non-
entity (T 252) 
Hume's claim is that his cessation would follow not from the removal of 
perceptions that enter into the differing constitution of some other self, but only from the 
removal ofhis own constitutive perceptions. This condition for the existence of the self 
specifies one ofthe way in which selves, as discrete entities, stand apart from each other: 
the dreamless sleep or death of one self never implies the sleep, wakefulness, death or life 
of any other self just as "when one is born blind [ ... ] the impressions [of sight and] their 
correspondent ideas" are lost not for all selves but only for the one who is born blind (T 
5). Hume's atomism operates primarily at the level of perceptions, especially in his 
analysis of simple impressions in succession. But his atomism also operates at the level 
of discrete selves. Although the self is always divisible into its constituting parts, each 
self is, as it were, surrounded by an epistemically impenetrable void that separates and 
renders it discrete from all others. While the bundle theory does not preclude the 
presumption that the self is a discrete entity, the theory does not justify it either, and in 
failing to provide some such justification, the bundle theory is deficient. 37 
37 It is important to note that this conception of the self as a discrete entity does not specify whether the self 
is a substance. In the final analysis, the self's substantive character remains an open question (albeit no 
longer a pressing one). Hume is clear that the self is not an independent, changeless and hidden unity in 
which changing accidents inhere. But perhaps there are other ways of conceiving the self to be a substance. 
For Hume, the pressing question is that of whether the selfs parts empirically exhibit a special or unique 
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Hume' s analysis of dreamless sleep also illuminates his other important 
presumption, i.e. , that the self is both a heap of bundled perceptions and an ongoing 
perception-bundling activity. It suggests, further, that the selfs bundling activity is no 
less fundamental for the self s ongoing existence than is the self s bundled perceptions. 
For Hume, the selfs everyday ordinary experience entails a removal of perceptions 
insofar as the selfs past and present perceptions are always succeeded upon by novel 
perceptions that take the place of the former. In this respect, dreamless sleep and ordinary 
experience are indistinguishable: both entail the same removal of past and present 
perceptions. In Burne' s account, however, the distinguishing mark between ordinary 
experience and dreamless sleep is that, whereas dreamless sleep entails both the cessation 
of the selfs ongoing receptivity to novel perceptions and the cessation of the selfs 
perception-associating or bundling activity, ordinary experience does not strictly entail 
the cessation of either. Thus Hume seems to agree in spirit with Descartes' claim that, " if 
I were to cease all thinking [i.e., perceiving] I would then utterly cease to exist."38 As 
such, what Hume views to be fundamental for the ongoing existence of any self, 
whatever that self s content might be, is the activity implied by the self not as a bundle, 
but as a bundler of perceptions. While any change in the self s bundled parts is sufficient 
to undercut the claim for the selfs changeless identity, only a cessation of the selfs 
receptive and bundling activity will realize the selfs complete cessation or non-existence. 
type of relation with one another, i.e., a relation that the self's parts do not exhibit in connection with any 
other (real or fictive) parts that are not present in or constitutive of the self. Hume 's analysis suggests that 
the self's parts form a cohesive and discrete collection inasmuch as each part is what it is exclusively 
through its ongoing relation and interaction with the other parts within the se lf. 
38 Rene Descartes, Meditations, Objections and Replies, ed. Roger Ariew and Donald Cress (Indianapolis: 
Hackett, 2006), 15. 
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Hume confesses in the Appendix to the Treatise that his bundle theory is 
problematic (T 633). It is puzzling, however, why Hume thought to cite the 'problems' 
that he does. 39 He claims that the bundle theory brings to a head an inconsistency 
between two equally well-reasoned principles: " [(i)] that all our distinct perceptions are 
distinct existences, and [(ii)] that the mind never perceives any real connection among 
distinct existences" (T 636). But as Kemp Smith points out,40 these principles are not 
inconsistent. Rather, the second principle follows from the first. If distinctness precludes 
all real connection, then there will be no perceivable real connection between two distinct 
existences. Hume's doubts seem to concern the degree to which the self draws its 
perceptions (i.e., those previously-separate entities it encounters) into a unity. 
This question of the self's unity seems to hinge on the issue of which aspect of the 
self one presumes to be fundamental. If one argues that the bundling aspect is 
fundamental, the self appears to be predictable and continuous, an unfolding of the same 
cardinal activities of association. If one holds the bundled aspect to be fundamental, the 
self appears to be a changing and incohesive mixture of perceptions. However, the 
consistency ofthe self's parts might change through time. InHume's analysis, the self 
begins as a passive and receptive being, an open door to an unconnected series of simple 
impressions. The early self is simple in elements but complex in disorder. As the 
bundling activity takes hold, the self begins to integrate new perceptions into an ever-
broadening network of associations. This complex network casts novel perceptions in a 
39 Donald C. Ainslie, "Hume's Reflections on the Identity and Simplicity of Mind," Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research, Vol. 62, No. 3 (May, 2001), 558. 
40 Norman Kemp Smith, The Philosophy of David Hume (London: Macmillan, 1941 ), 555-58. 
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holistic light, situating each into an elegant pattern with little trace of their fom1er chaos. 
In short, novel perceptions no longer appear novel (at least not in any radical sense). Thus 
the self can be viewed, in terms of mereology, as a simplicity tending toward complexity 
or, in terms of order, as a chaotic complexity tending toward well-behaved simplicity. 
But, more fundamentally, this analysis suggests that the self is structured by a particular 
path of development, i.e., from an entity that is purely receptive of perceptions to an 
entity that is characterized by mixture of perception-receptivity and perception-
associating activity. Thus while the selfs endurance may be purely relative, its telos or 
path of development appears to be otherwise. 
PART III. HUME'S DENIAL OF SELF-PERCEPTION 
As noted in the Introduction to this Chapter, Hume's attempts to perceive himself, 
to center himself in a perception, always result in a perception of something other than 
himself; e.g., Hume perceives the furniture in his study. Although Hume does not argue 
as much, this phenomenon seems to support the thesis that the self is diaphanous in the 
sense that "when we try to focus on it, we see through it to its object(s)."41 A key feature 
ofHume's account, however, is that in addition to striking upon this first diaphanous 
perception, he claims also to perceive that he has failed to perceive himself. The claim is 
41 Kenneth R. Merri ll , Historical Dictionary ofHume 's Philosophy (USA: Scarecrow Press, 2008), 128. 
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that the self alone is never perceived but the failure to perceive the self is perceived. But 
Hume cannot know that he has failed to perceive himself without already knowing what 
not failing to perceive himself would consist in, i.e., without anticipating at least some of 
the details of a counterfactual case in which he did not fail to perceive himself.42 
Scholars have questioned what self-perception, on a bundle theory view, would 
entail. Some have regarded Hume's claim that the self cannot perceive itself to be ironic 
or merely a moment in his polemic against substantivism and not representative of his 
overall position. Pitson, for example, claims that it is Hume's view that self-perception or 
"self-awareness consists essentially in the occurrence of a certain perception- namely, a 
perception of myself as a series ofperceptions-within the series."43 Noonan' s 
interpretation is similar. For Noonan, Humean self-perception consists in "a perception 
which is a perception of the perceptions constituting the mind as a bundle."44 But the 
claim forwarded by both Pitson and Noonan finds little textual support in the Treatise. In 
discussing abstract ideas, Hume argues against an infinite capacity in the mind. He claims 
that when we perceive an abstract or general idea such as that of a triangle we do not 
thereby perceive all possible variations of the object at once or in a single perception and 
neither do we perceive an unending series of perceptions in which each possible variation 
ofthe object is given due consideration. Instead, our perception always tends toward a 
singular object, e.g., toward a particular triangle. Hume is thus likely to disagree with 
Pitson and Noonan's claim that the mind can perceive all its present and past perceptions 
42 Noonan claims, " if Hume has no idea of a selfhe presumably has no conception of what it would be like 
to observe one. In that case, however, how does he know that he is not doing so? Maybe he is, but j ust fails 
to recognize the fact" (Harold W. Noonan, Persona/Identity, 2"d ed. (London: Routledge, 2003), 68). 
43 A. E. Pitson, Hume 's Philosophy of The Self(New York: Routledge, 2002), 40. 
44 Harold W. Noonan, Persona/Identity, 2"d ed. (London: Routledge, 2003), 164. 
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at once or in a single perception. Fortunately, the bundle theory implies a model 
according to which the self can perceive itself without perceiving all of its content at 
once. Thus self-perception can be simple in content and free from any conflict with 
Burne's analysis of abstract ideas. 
If a thing perceives itself at a particular time then that thing, at that time, both 
' perceives' and ' is perceived' through the same act of perception. In terms ofthe bundle 
theory, self-perception implicates the bundling (or active) aspect ofthe self as that which 
perceives and the bundled (or passive) aspect of the self as that which is perceived. If the 
self is discrete,45 then the self is finite or limited in the quantity of properties or parts that 
it contains. The active and passive aspects, as aspects of this finite self, must also be 
finite. A self-perception which implicates both aspects might, therefore, be doubly finite 
or twice limited in content because the content of the self-perception must be finite on 
account of the selfs finite active (perceiving) aspect and on account of the selfs finite 
passive (perceived) aspect. For this reason, self-perception may well be simple because 
neither the full spectrum of the selfs bundling activity, nor the full collection of its 
bundled perceptions is, of necessity, entailed in the self-perception's content. 
The argument that self-perception requires the self to perceive all its parts at once 
seems to rest on the idea that ifthe self could perceive all its parts, it would somehow 
know these parts to be its own and it would therefore know that what it perceives is its 
own constitution and not the constitution of something else, e.g. , the constitution of 
another self. But, in Burne's view, the self is always incapable of knowing whether its 
45 See the definition of 'discrete entity' on pp. 3-4. 
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parts exist only within itself or whether they exist in other selves as well. The self cannot 
know whether exact mereological copies of itself exist. It cannot even know whether 
every other self that exists is, in fact, an exact mereological copy of itself. Even if the self 
could perceive all its parts at once, it could never know whether these parts were (i) only 
or exclusively in itself, (ii) in itself and in other copy selves as well, or (iii) in itself and in 
all selves (i.e. , in the case that all selves are copies of one another). Thus it seems that 
while a self cannot perceive itself without perceiving at least one of its parts, the number 
of parts (greater than zero) that the self perceives is not essential. Even if the self could 
perceive all its parts at once, it could not know this perception to be a self-evident case of 
self-perception. 
This leads us to the question: 'Given that the self cannot know whether it contains 
such-and-such parts exclusively, what else does the self perceive about its parts, or about 
the way in which it perceives its parts, which might lead to, or be constitutive of, self-
perception?' For Hume, the self as a bundle of perceptions aggregates all the perceptions 
it encounters into itself. As such, all the selfs perceptions are parts of the self. To this 
extent, the self perceives itself whenever it perceives anything. But it seems that the self 
could and probably very often does perceive something without perceiving that what it 
perceives, i.e., its perception, is a part of itself. How, then, does the self perceive that 
every perception is always already a case of self-perception? It is on this question that 
Hume' s two presumptions, i.e., that the self is discrete and that the self has both an active 
and a passive aspect, find their connection. If the self perceives itself then the self is both 
perceiving and perceived. But if we attempt to divide the self into two discrete entities, 
35 
one perceiving and the other perceived, we strike an impasse: discrete entities are 
incapable of perceiving, and of being perceived by, one another. In the case of the self, 
the active aspect's inability to perceive anything but the parts constitutive of the passive 
aspect, i.e., its epistemic access to only those parts, suggests that the two aspects persist 
within one and the same discrete entity. 
Hume's bundle theory implies that selves have numerous things in common: e.g., 
perceptions, associations, memories, etc. But it seems that an infinite number of 
perceptions, associations and memories are possible. Since every self, by contrast, is 
finite it is thus possible that no two selves will ever share a particular perception, 
association or memory in common. There are also cases to consider where few salient 
memories (e.g., in amnesiacs) and few or no associations (e.g., in newborn humans) 
appear to obtain. What then, is the criterion of a self? The above account of self-
perception suggests an answer. A self might be defined as anything that perceives any 
one of its parts. 46 We may distinguish a self as fully self-aware if it additionally perceives 
that its active perceiving aspect and its passive perceived aspect are not themselves 
discrete from one another but, instead, subsist within the same discrete entity. The bundle 
theory exploits the differences that obtain between selves, the differences of past and of 
character, and focuses less upon the properties common to all selves. When the bundle 
theory is combined with a positive account of self-perception, however, a more complete 
picture of the self and selfhood emerges. 
46 Arguments aiming to establish the selfhood of ce11ain non-human systems exhibiting perceptive abilities, 
e.g., the higher animals, computers, etc., may find this definition useful. 
36 
CONCLUSION 
Hume' s scepticism about the self is motivated by a belief that any conclusion we 
reach on its nature, like those reached on the nature of God, will beget the liveliest of 
consequences. Although the bundle theory is, by Hume' s own admission, inadequate, it is 
not irredeemably so, and the profound influence it has had on subsequent philosophy of 
mind is a testament to this fact. 47 Hume postulates a self that is non-identical, complex 
and endlessly becoming. Its past and future are shrouded in probabilities and its full , 
present constitution is ever impenetrable to its own self-perceiving advances. 
Hume is often credited as having drawn classical empiricism to its logical 
conclusions. But in addition to this consummation, he opens a new tradition wherein the 
self is approached as something which is incapable of any full or adequate reflection 
upon itself, and wherein self-knowledge is held to be not a self-evident starting place, but 
a distant goal that is always to some extent unrealized, if not unrealizable. In short, he 
inaugurates a tradition in which the selftheorist's use of the first-person singular 
pronoun, ' I,' is always problematic and imbued with a subtle irony. 
But Hume's denial of self-perception, rather than providing the sceptical 
constraint its author sought, produces only an epistemological contradiction. Just as a 
47 For example, the Treatise has been hailed as " the foundational document of cognitive science" (Jerry 
Fodor qtd. in Kenneth R. Merrill, Historical Dictionary of Hume 's Philosophy (USA: Scarecrow Press, 
2008), 188). 
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figure cannot be both square and round, a self cannot be both (i) able to call its own 
nature into question and, (ii) unable to perceive itself. The question Hume sought to 
answer, the question of the self, like the question, ' What am I?' presupposes that the 
object in question can be perceived. The question is really one of what more can be 
known of the self in addition to and on the basis of the fact that the self can be perceived. 
Suppose a sceptic insists, ' I cannot perceive myself nor do I know what I am. ' If 
by 'I' the sceptic refers to himself, i.e., to some conception of himself, then clearly he 
must have some idea of what 'I' means, and by extension, of what ' I' is. If, on the other 
hand, he really does not perceive, think of or have a meaning attached to the term, '1,' his 
statement ought to be purged of its appeal to the grammar of the first person singular and 
rephrased as follows: ' (x) cannot perceive (x) nor do/does (x) know what (x) am/are/is.' 
Clearly this second statement is nonsense. The use of 'I' as a first-person singular 
pronoun presupposes a belief on the user ' s part about that in which the first-person 
consists, just as the use of 'I' as a roman numeral presupposes some belief about the 
nature of number. 
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CHAPTER2 
HUSSERL'S THEORY OF THE SELF 
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INTRODUCTION 
A survey of his early philosophical writings would not suggest that Edmund 
Husser! (1859-1938), the pupil of Brentano and leading proponent of the latter's 
intentionality theory of consciousness, would go on to become a major theorist of the 
self. In his early work, Husserl dismisses the traditional conception of the self as a 
groundless fiction and holds that man's immanent experiences appear to exist "in a 
nowhere land" and "[for] no one at all."48 As his career progressed, however, Husser! 
began to explore objects of experience as structures which bear the stamp of being 
intended and wholly constituted by a complex and active self, a self which can endlessly 
examine and explicate itself in form and content. Proceeding from the constitution and 
temporality of objects as ' transcendental clues,' Husser! uncovers the self as the principle 
and constituting origin not only of all its objects and acts but also of whatever sense or 
meaning it has for itself as a self-reflective entity. 
Like Hurne, Descartes and other luminaries in western philosophy of the self, 
Husserl ' s aim in analysing the self is to uncover a universal foundation that can 
distinguish the genuine sciences from pseudoscience and support and defend science 
against principled sceptical attack. In Husser! ' s view, the selection of the self as a 
universal foundation is justified on the basis of the selfs fundamental or absolute 
48 Rudolf Bernet, I so Kern and Eduard Marbach, An Introduction to Husser/ian Phenomenology (Evanston, 
Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1993), 206. 
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evidence of which he distinguishes two forms. 49 The first form, which is indubitable and 
establishes the "inconceivability of the non-being of the evident thing, " 50 is called 
apodictic evidence. The second form, marked by its complete comprehensiveness, is 
called adequate evidence. Husserl 's claim is that the self is grounded in apodictic 
evidence, i.e., in the self-giving or immediately intuited veracity ofthe selfs existence 
which, as apodictic, "discloses itself [as] the absolute unimaginableness 
(inconceivability) of [its] non-being, and thus exclud[es] in advance every doubt as 
'objectless', empty" (CM 16). He is clear, however, that the selfis not grounded in 
adequate evidence, i.e., in the selfs experience of itself as completely or 
comprehensively self-given. Husser] came to view adequate evidence as a guiding goal or 
ideal for which the phenomenologist always strives but, in practice, never possesses. 51 
The self is thus "not adequate but it is apodictic."52 Although it is revealed to the 
phenomenologist in some apodictic details, the self always remains extensively open to 
further refinement, reformulation and discovery. 
In this chapter, I analyse Husserl's Cartesian Meditations (first published in 1931) 
and his attempts therein to illuminate this apodictically evidenced self. 53 I offer a critique 
49 Husser( defines evidence as the "the self-giving, of an affair[ .. . ] or other objectivity, in the mode: ' itself 
there', 'immediately intuited ', 'given original iter"' (Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations: an 
Introduction to Phenomenology, trans. Dorian Cairns (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982), 57. Cited 
hereafter as "CM"). 
50 Paul Ricoeur, Husser!: An Analysis of His Phenomenology, trans. Edward G. Ballard and Lester E. 
Embree (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 2007), 86. 
51 John J. Drummond, Historical Dictionary of Husser! 's Philosophy (Lanhan, Maryland: The Scarecrow 
Press, 2008), 32. 
52 Paul Ricoeur, Husser!: An Analysis of His Phenomenology, trans. Edward G. Ballard and Lester E. 
Embree (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 2007), 90. 
53 Cartesian Meditations is widely regarded as Husserl's most mature treatment of the self and of the 
transcendental role of the ego in phenomenology. Subtitled, 'an Introduction to Phenomenology,' the work 
aims to uncover the existence and nature of the ego. Since Husser( is known to have shifted his views on 
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of his efforts to forward the modem claim that the self is the sole pre-scientific 
foundation upon which both the sciences and all genuine philosophy must rest. I focus on 
his account of pre-reflective and reflective self-awareness and his claim that the selfs 
innermost core, i.e., its functioning consciousness, always evades the reflection necessary 
for any would-be explication of it. In the course of his phenomenology, Husser! finds 
new grounds to support a Humean claim, i.e., the claim that the self is unable to gain an 
adequate or comprehensive understanding of itself through reflection. Husserl ' s key 
grounds for this claim are twofold: 
(i) The horizonal framework in which objects in reflection (i.e., reflective 
objects) are invariably presented precludes a complete or adequate 
understanding of the reflective object, and thus also of the self as it is 
presented in reflection; 
(ii) The functioning or performing consciousness that forms the center of the 
self cannot be reflected upon or thematically explored due to the 
unbridgeable gap between the pre-temporal situatedness of the selfs 
functioning consciousness and the temporal situatedness of the selfs 
acts, objects and attempts at understanding within an always advancing 
temporal life-stream; 
the ego throughout his career, Cartesian Meditations suggests itself as an essential text to any research 
which aims, as this thesis does, not to measure the shifts in Husserl ' s thought but, rather, to analyse his 
mature, and in many ways final, critique of the self. 
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I argue that Husser!' s claim that the self's understanding of itself is always inadequate or 
incomplete is problematic and threatens to undermine the intelligibility of the self as the 
common foundation for science and phenomenology. We have dubious grounds for 
claiming the self as a foundation if our reflections on the self are, as Husser! suggests, not 
merely vague at the edges but vacuous at the core. 
Although he worked untiringly to counter the charge of advancing a new 
solipsism, Husser! accepted that the phenomenologist works, at least for a portion of her 
study, from within a comportment toward the world which takes as its principle that 
everything encountered by the phenomenologist is something which has a sense or 
meaning solely ' for her', that this sense is constituted solely ' from her', and that the 
things encountered by her have being solely 'in her.' As a result of this solipsistic 
filtration, Husserl ' s exegesis of the self explodes in scope and encircles all that is 
incidental and fundamental in all aspects of all possible objects and acts. Once one has 
grasped the central characteristics of his phenomenology, however, his theory of the self 
can be approached through an examination of his key characterizations of the self as an 
ego pole, life-stream, eidos ego, monad and functioning consciousness. To this end, I 
shall begin with a review of Husser!' s celebrated epoche, and his account of 
intentionality. 
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PART I. THE EPOCHE 
In Cartesian Mediations, Husserllauds the "absolute unprejudicedness" (CM 36), 
radical authenticity and "self-responsibility" (CM 6) he finds in Descartes. Citing the 
latter's injunction that each philosopher affirm only the indubitable "for himself and in 
himself' (CM 7), he claims that his phenomenology is nee-Cartesian in precisely this 
"absolutely self-responsible" (CM 6) spirit and in its quest to discover a 
presuppositionless beginning (CM 1 ). Husser! also shares Descartes' goal of discovering 
an "absolute foundation" (CM 1) or "transcendental grounding" (CM 27) for the 
sciences. But he rejects what he understands to be the deductive bias of the Cartesian 
system (CM 7) and argues that science must be founded not upon "an axiom, ego cogito, 
but [only upon] an all-embracing self-investigation" (CM 156). Instead of concluding in 
or deriving from an indubitable self-evident formula, e.g., cogito ergo sum, 
phenomenology attempts an ever-widening self-investigation which frequently retraces 
and reexamines its own steps in an attempt to produce a rigorous account of the 
peripheral and core structures of subjectivity. This self-investigation depends wholly 
upon the correct performance of the epoch e. 
Husser! indicates that the epoche, like the Cartesian programme of universal 
doubt, can only serve as a method for one who has already established, or presupposed, a 
conception of himself as "me, the one who is meditating" (CM 25). Although Husser! 
views the self under a manifold of characterizations, this initial conception figures 
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prominently in his final theory of the self. And while he would argue that this initial 
conception is shown to be necessary by later phenomenological developments, these 
developments depend without exception upon the conception of the self as an isolated, 
self-responsible and self-affirming meditator. 
The epoche begins in a manner that is again reminiscent of Cartesian doubt, i.e., it 
begins with the meditating ego' s recognition that he has only imperfect grounds with 
which to counter the sceptic' s claim that the world is but a "coherent dream" (CM 17). 
The meditating ego, having discovered the dubitability of the world, is now led to affirm 
the "being of the world [ ... ] only [as] an acceptance-phenomenon" (CM 18), i.e., only as 
a thing which can bear a sense or meaning/or him (e.g., the sense of ' existing' or ' not-
existing' ). The meditator thereby suspends questions about the world ' s ontological status, 
its causal relations and its alleged possession of things-in-themselves. 
Husser! presents the epoche as a systematic neutralization, parenthesizing or 
bracketing of the naYve realism of the natural attitude, i.e., of the view of the world as a 
realm which exists independent of the ongoing activity of any ego. He is careful to 
distinguish this bracketing from the "general demolition"54 of beliefs prescribed by 
Cartesian doubt. Instead, the epoche fosters a "detached and impartial"55 and 
"nonpositional attitude,"56 i.e., an attitude not of disbelief, but of non-belief. The adoption 
of this non-positional attitude sets the phenomenologist upon a ' return to the things 
themselves,' a return which has as its goal the discovery of a universal foundation, an 
54 Rene Descartes, Meditations, Objections and Replies, ed. Roger Ariew and Donald Cress (Indianapolis: 
Hackett, 2006), 9. 
55 Jean-Marc Laporte, S. J. , "Husserl's Critique of Descartes," Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Mar., 1963): 339. 
56 Ibid., 338. 
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"intrinsically first field of knowledge" (CM 23), or set of "absolute insights [ ... ] behind 
which one cannot go back any further" (CM 2). 
The phenomenologist, no longer affirming that the world exists independent of 
him, focuses upon the actual and possible sense that the world and every object has for 
him. Overturning Descartes' second injunction, i.e., to "withdraw the mind from the 
senses,"57 he now accepts only phenomenology's 'principle of principles,' i.e., that 
"everything intuitively presented is to be accepted as true as it presents itself and only so 
far as and in the manner in which it presents itself."58 Thus he encounters objects of 
experience not as the pale representations of things existing in an independent world but 
as immanent, open and self-revealing structures which can be gradually unfolded to 
greater degrees of clarity and comprehensiveness. This study of 'everything presented' 
exclusively in terms of the features with which everything is presented proceeds by 
description. Explanation, which presupposes and is founded upon description, is exiled 
from use. 
Now that neither the world nor any object in it is assumed to exist independently, 
all things are treated as things which have a sense for the self As such, the self is 
"necessarily presupposed" (CM 26) by this overturning of realism. Husser! claims that 
the self, qua necessary, is "legitimately called transcendental" (CM 26) and is given to 
itself "as existing" (CM 139) and as an " intrinsically first" (CM 8) principle within which 
alone "every grounding, every showing of truth and being, goes on" (CM 82). 
57 Rene Descartes, Meditations, Objections and Replies, ed. Roger Ariew and Donald Cress (Indianapolis: 
Hackett, 2006), 6. 
58 John J. Drummond, Historical Dictionary of Husser! 's Philosophy (Lanhan, Maryland: The Scarecrow 
Press, 2008), 170. 
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Accordingly, objects are reconceived as the direct correlates and outcomes ofthe selfs 
sense-giving subjective processes: "objects exist for me, and are what they are, only as 
objects of actual and possible consciousness" (CM 65). The world now signifies only a 
"world constituted[ .. . ] purely within the transcendental ego" (CM 52). For Husser!, this 
affirmation of the ego's centrality follows not from a dubious metaphysics, but from the 
renaissance of an implicit, pre-existing and pre-critical attitude toward experience. 
The self forms the centre ofthis newly rediscovered attitude as the irreducible 
subject of all phenomenological descriptions and the immutable core of phenomenology 
as a "transcendental theory of knowledge [about experience]" (CM 81 ). It comes as a 
price of its centrality and role as foundation, however, that the self has no foundation of 
its own, i.e., that, as the first principle ofHusserl' s "transcendental idealism" (CM 86), 
the self is a principle ' behind which one cannot go back any further.' The 
phenomenological discovery that "natural being [ .. . ] presupposes the realm of 
transcendental being" (CM 21) entails as a consequence that the transcendental ego at the 
center of this transcendental field does not and cannot presuppose any deeper realm: all 
being, Husser! claims, "derives its whole sense and its existential status [ . .. ] from me as 
the transcendental ego" (CM 26). Although its foundations are thus foreclosed, He claims 
that much of the self remains open for discovery. He writes of Descartes: 
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The evidence of the proposition, ego cogito, ego sum [sic] -
remained barren because Descartes neglected [ .. . ] to direct his 
attention to the fact that the ego can explicate itself ad infinitum 
and systematically, by means of transcendental experience, and 
therefore lies ready as a possible field of work (CM 31) 
In transcendental phenomenology, each object, as "a product of transcendental 
subjectivity, a product constituted in [an intentional] performance" (CM 85) and as a 
'transcendental clue,' illuminates two pathways of exchange: "the radiation [of 
intentionality] from the ego [toward its objects]"59 and the "counter-radiation that issues 
from the objects [toward the ego ]."60 Thus our experience of objects is approached both 
as experience of an object (Erfahrung) and as experience for a subject (Erlebnis) . But, 
since the object and subject are no longer held to be ontologically distinct, the selfs 
'outward moving' constitution of objects is also explored insofar as it entails a parallel 
and simultaneous constitution of the self. Husser! recognizes that if "the constitution of 
the ego contains all the constitutions of all the objectivities existing for him, whether 
these be immanent or transcendent, ideal or real" (CM 75) then, as Drummond puts it, " in 
constituting objects the self also constitutes itself."61 Thus, every description of the selfs 
intentionality and its constitution of objects is always also a description belonging to a 
"transcendental-descriptive egology" (CM 38), i.e., to an "intentional self-explication" 
(CM 153) ofthe selfs "self-constitution" (CM 66). This self-constitution is uncovered 
59 Paul Ricoeur, Husser/: An Analysis of His Phenomenology, trans. Edward G. Ballard and Lester E. 
Embree (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 2007), 53. 
60 fbid . 
61 John J. Drummond, Historical Dictionary of Husser/'s Philosophy (Lanhan, Maryland: The Scarecrow 
Press, 2008), 55. 
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primarily through genetic phenomenology which, in contrast to static phenomenology, 
does not merely consider the present sense and constitution of objects but which aims to 
uncover the necessary developments in the generation of this sense and constitution over 
time. The result of the epoche is then, in sum, to reveal the transcendental character of 
phenomenology as an "absolutely subjective" science and the role of the self as its 
"universal" (CM 38) and "sole theme" (CM 30). The phenomenologist is thereby sent 
forth with "the all-embracing task of uncovering [him]self, in [his] full concreteness -
that is, with all the intentional correlates that are included therein" (CM 38). 
But the epoche has another, more invasive effect. The movement of the self "from 
the world and from its body in the world [to a position from which it can] question its 
body and the world"62 causes a crisis or splitting of the ego wherein the 
"phenomenological ego establishes itself as ' disinterested onlooker', above the naively 
interested ego"' (CM 35). In other words, "the phenomenological meditating ego 
[becomes] the 'non-participant onlooker' at himself' (CM 37). The vista opened by this 
splitting presents the self as the psychological, empirical or worldly ego, i.e., as an ego 
characterized by its sense ofbeing contained within a transcendent and independently 
existing world and which, thereby, sharply contrasts with the sense of the transcendental 
ego as that which constitutes and contains all acts and objects within itself. Although the 
two egos "must at first be kept strictly distinct" (CM 32), as phenomenology progresses it 
becomes clear that the splitting is not founded upon any parallel and underlying 
ontological division within the ego's core but is, instead, a splitting or separation 
62 Jean-Marc Laporte, S. J., "Husserl's Critique of Descartes," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 
Vol. 23, No.3 (Mar. , 1963): 339. 
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"grounded in an underlying connection."63 The splitting does not unsettle "the unity of 
the concrete ego" (CM 38). Nevertheless the drifting apart of the two egos forms a lasting 
theme in Husserl's phenomenology: "the more the soul [i.e., psyche] is objectified, the 
more the pure ego has to be removed from objectification."64 As a result of this process, 
the transcendental ego faces a peculiar experience of being "at the two extremities: as 
man at the extremity of objectification, as transcendental ego at the extremity of 
subjectivity."65 Although he insists that the splitting or double reification of the ego is not 
fundamental, neither of the egos, conceived as outcomes ofthe split, cease to be of 
concern to Husser!. 
In his efforts to move phenomenology beyond a "transcendental solipsism" (CM 
30), Husser! is especially concerned with exploring the sense of the world as being not 
merely "my private synthetic formation but [ . . . ] as an intersubjective world actually there 
for everyone" (CM 91 ). But he struggles with the phenomenological grounds upon which 
to establish that "other egos - not as mere worldly phenomena but as other transcendental 
egos - can become positable as existing and thus become equally legitimate themes of a 
phenomenological egology" (CM 30). Moreover, he precludes any return to a realist 
approach to the world, to other egos or to both as, in principle, absurd: 
63 Hans Bernhard Schmid, "Apodictic Evidence," Husser/ Studies, Vol. 7 (200 I): 229. 
64 Paul Ricoeur, Husser/: An Analysis of His Phenomenology, trans. Edward G. Ballard and Lester E. 
Embree (Evanston, lllinois: Northwestern University Press, 2007), 67. 
65 Ibid., 68. 
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The attempt to conceive the universe of true being as something 
lying outside the universe of possible consciousness, possible 
knowledge, possible evidence, the two being related to one 
another merely externally by a rigid law, is nonsensical. [ ... ] If 
transcendental subjectivity is the universe of possible sense, then 
an outside is precisely- nonsense (CM 84). 
Thus, although it was conceived as a neutral bracketing, the epoche fundamentally shifts 
the phenomenologist's orientation toward the realism of the natural attitude. Although it 
is unclear whether, as Husser! claimed, there is any route which is both consistent with 
the epoche and which also leads out of solipsism or whether the epoche's solipsism is 
final, it is in any case certain that the epoche provides no grounds upon which to reaffirm 
the natural attitude. The epoche reveals the world to be unthinkable without the 
transcendental ego or self. But the self, in turn, is not "a little tag-end of the world" (CM 
24), and "would continue to exist [even if] this world were non-existent" (CM 3). Thus 
the epoche "dispel[s] irrevocably the realistic illusion of the in-itself'66 and of the world 
as a transcendent, independent realm. 
Although the epoche opens the self to itself as a field of possible enquiry, Husserl 
is known to have rejected the Cartesian doctrine of self-transparency according to which 
the self is always granted an adequate and apodictic understanding of its own inner 
contents. Thus he rejects Descartes' claims that "nothing can be perceived more easily 
and more evidently than my own mind"67 and that "there cannot be anything within me of 
66 fbid., 88. 
67 Rene Descartes, Meditations, Objections and Replies, ed. Roger Ariew and Donald Cress (Indianapolis: 
Hackett, 2006), 19. 
51 
which I am not somehow aware."68 For Husserl, self-experience is not a groundless or 
impossible venture. But he is also clear that self-experience is neither to be understood as 
apodictic, i.e., as "absolutely indubitable in respect of single details" (CM 28), or as 
adequate, for it can always be "enriched, without limit" (CM 29). 
While Husserl evidently supported the doctrine of self-transparency in his early 
career,
69 he came to reject the view that the self can reflect upon itself in a "special and 
direct way."70 Instead, he argues that the self is reflected upon in a way that is similar to 
the way in which objects are reflected upon. Just as objects in reflection are presented 
with horizons, "I am given to myself( .. . ) with an open infinite horizon of still 
undiscovered internal features of my own." 71 An analysis of Husserl' s theory of 
intentionality will help to clarify this horizon and its significance for his theory of the 
self. 
PART II. INTENTIONALITY 
Intentionality is the theory according to which all consciousness is consciousness 
of or about something or, as Husser] puts it, that "every conscious process is, in itself, 
68 Ibid., 62. 
69 Hans Bernhard Schmid, "Apodictic Evidence," Husser/ Studies, Vol. 7 (200 I), 220. 
70 Sydney Shoemaker, "On Knowing One's Own Mind," Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 2 ( 1988), 183. 
71 Hans Bernhard Schmid, "Apodictic Evidence," Husser/ Studies, Vol. 7 (200 I), 221. The emphasis is 
mine. 
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consciousness of such and such" (CM 33). For Husser!, consciousness of an object is 
understood both in terms ofthe Weise or mode in which the object is presented (e.g., 
perceived, remembered, doubted, etc.) as well as the Wie or mode-independent qualities 
that the object presents (e.g., shape, color, etc.). Each conscious act "means something or 
other" (CM 33) and, as such, exhibits a sense or meaning which is understood both as a 
sense given to the object (noema) and as a sense given from the self (noesis). Similarly, 
every act of consciousness is understood both in terms of a cogito or act of thinking and a 
cogitatum or thing toward which the act is aimed. Examples of cogitatum include objects, 
states of affairs and other conscious acts. 
Whenever an object is presented to consciousness, the object is presented within 
or in combination with what Husser! calls a horizon. He describes this horizon in terms of 
its inner and outer features. The inner horizon points to the possibilities for qualitatively 
and formally different presentations of the object in subsequent and antecedent acts. The 
outer horizon indicates the presented object's relation to other objects which are or can be 
thematically related to the presented object. Both forms of horizon foreshadow Husserl ' s 
theory oftime. Husser! is not an atomist with respect to time. He rejects the Cartesian 
doctrine of punctualism according to which "the present time does not depend on the time 
immediately preceding it."72 Instead, it is his view that the acts and objects of 
consciousness always contain an inseparable share of retention (or sense of the past) and 
pretention (or sense ofthe future). 73 
72 Rene Descartes, Meditations, Objections and Replies, ed. Roger Ariew and Donald Cress (Indianapolis: 
Hackett, 2006), 97. 
73 For Husserl ' s analysis of some of the temporal and horizonal characteristics that a mundane object 
(specificially, a piece of chalk) can exhibit, see Edmund Husserl, On the Phenomenology of the 
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The selfs constitution of its objects and of itself is neither intermittent nor 
episodic but the outcome of a continuous process. For Husser!, consciousness is closely 
identified with a synthesizing activity that continually integrates and draws all acts of 
constitution together in a way that tends towards unity.74 As a result of this synthesis, the 
selfs experience does not confront him as a "chaos of intentional processes," (CM 54) 
but as the ordered and "harmonious flow" (CM 29) of objects that endure through time 
and are situated within complex and durable horizons. The orderly sense that objects have 
for the self is only possible because of this synthesis for "every sense is a synthesis of 
identification."75 Thus the selfs synthesis activity is essential for the constitution and 
explication of the sense that the self presents to itself. 
In Husserl's phenomenology, each conscious act or cogito "reveals itselfthrough 
[or in] a horizonal structure." 76 In perceiving a table, for example, I also perceive, by 
virtue ofthe table's horizon, that I am capable of having other perceptions ofthe table, 
and as such, that I can freely take up other conscious acts in addition to the act I presently 
embrace. Thus, as Ricoeur puts it, the "horizonal structure is the index of [the ego's] 
liberty."77 Similarly, when reflecting upon itself and taking itself as an object, the 
transcendental ego is presented with an "open horizon" (CM 23) of"undetermined 
determinability" (CM 30), such that whatever part of the ego is objectified or presented 
Consciousness of internal Time (1983-1 917), trans. J. Brough (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 
1991), 8. 
74 According to Murphy, Husserl holds the transcendental ego to be "a universal constituting synthesis in 
which [the ego's acts of] constitution are encompassed in a determinately ordered way" (Richard T. 
Murphy, "Husserl and Pre-Reflexive Constitution," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 26, 
No. I (Sep., 1965): I 03). 
75 Paul Ricoeur, Husser/: An Analysis of His Phenomenology, trans. Edward G. Ballard and Lester E. 
Embree (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 2007), 96. 
76 Ibid., 98. 
77 Ibid., 98. 
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within the reflective act is always presented as a being a surface behind which other 
absent or non-objectified parts of the ego remain undiscovered. Although Husser! claims 
that "horizons are 'predelineated' potentialities [which] we can explicate or unfold[ ... ] at 
a particular time" (CM 45), the performing or functioning consciousness which forms the 
core of the transcendental ego is always absent from any reflection upon the self. Before 
turning to his theory of inner time consciousness in which this invariable absence 
becomes apparent, we must consider Husserl's other key characterizations of the self: the 
self as ego pole, as life-stream, as eidos ego and as monad. In Husser!' s view, the ego is 
itself responsible for generating these characterizations. 
PART III. THE EGO POLE, LIFE-STREAM, EIDOS EGO AND MONAD 
Husser! argues that one of the key ways in which the transcendental ego 
conceives of itself is as "I, who live this and that subjective process, who live through this 
and that cogito, as the same I" (CM 66). This conception of the ego as the changeless and 
"abstract stratum of concrete things"78 presupposes and flows out of the ego' s synthesis 
of experience. The ego as pole or formal substratum is taken to underlie all experience, to 
78 RichardT. Murphy, Hume and Husser/: Towards Radical Subjectivism {The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 1980), 99. 
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be an identical principle in contrast to the changing acts and objects of consciousness. 
This conception is reminiscent of Descartes' view of the self. Descartes claims: 
The human mind is not likewise composed of any accidents[ .. . ] 
for even if all its accidents were changed, so that it understands 
different things, wills different things, senses different things 
[etc.] the mind itself does not on that score become something 
different.79 
Husser! unfolds three senses of the ego qua pole or substratum. First, the ego is a pole 
over and against the changing objects of consciousness. Second, the ego "as subject of his 
pure cogitationes" (CM 3), is a pole underlying all subjective or conscious acts. These 
two senses are complimentary: "the identical ego, who, as the active and affected subject 
of consciousness, lives in all processes of consciousness and is related, through them, to 
all object-poles" (CM 66). Third, the ego is conceived as "the substrate of habitualities" 
(CM 66), which I shall address below. 
Ricoeur correctly points out that Husser! tries to ' go beyond the abstraction' of a 
"[pure] ego which is not an object at all, which is in no way an intended noematic unity, 
[and is], therefore only a point-like 1."80 While it is true that the ego as pole, i.e., as a 
barren substratum, is point-like with respect to qualities, it is not prima facie point-like 
with respect to time. The ego is not conceived as merely ' this pole of this object, act or 
79 Rene Descartes, Meditations, Objections and Replies, ed. Roger Ariew and Donald Cress (Indianapolis: 
Hackett, 2006), 7. 
80 Paul Ricoeur, Husser!: An Analysis of His Phenomenology, trans. Edward G. Ballard and Lester E. 
Embree (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 2007), 54. 
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habit at this time' but as the pole of all objects, acts and habits and, as such, as the 
integration of all three in time. Husser!, however, makes the passage from a point-like to 
a qualitatively broad or field-like conception of the self through his second 
characterization of the ego as a life-stream. 
Husser! came to accept, as Schmid puts it, that the "transcendental ego [is] 
inseparable from the processes making up his life"81 and claimed that "the ego' s self-
explication [is] his explication of his conscious life" (CM 63). Noting the harmonious 
flow of conscious acts, he began to conceive of the self as not merely a static pole, form 
and principle of order, but as a flux, an activity which brings about the synthesis of its 
own experience as an intelligible and harmonious temporal stream. Under this 
conception, the self is held to be not something exclusive and independent over and 
against the stream but something which has the sense of ' moving' within it (CM 64). The 
self is not a single "process or [even] a continuity of processes" (CM 67) but is, rather, 
the moving origin of all processes such that, as one process ceases, "1, with my life, 
remain untouched in my existential status" (CM 25). The stream of conscious acts is, in 
an important respect, accessible to the ego insofar as the ego can "contemplate it and [ ... ] 
explicate and describe it" (CM 31 ). This is the meaning of Husser! ' s phrase " this life is 
always there for me" (CM 19). In reflecting upon the life-strean1, the ego does not grasp 
the life-stream entirely but takes up some of its retained content and considers it again as 
a unity that is "inseparable from [his] ego and therefore belong[s] to [his] concreteness 
itself' (CM 89). 
81 Hans Bernhard Schmid, "Apodictic Evidence," Husser/ Studies, Vol. 7 (200 I): 22 1. 
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The ego conceived as life-stream indicates the way in which the ego "constitutes 
itself in [a unified] history" (CM 75), and produces the sedimentation of its own 
constitution through time. The ego "is not an empty pole of identity [because] with every 
act emanating from him and having a new objective sense, he acquires a new abiding 
property" (CM 66). These durable properties which the self acquires through time form 
an important part of the self-explication of the ego. The "habituality of my ego" (CM 68) 
forms "ego-determinations" (CM 1 04) which are included within my "self-transforming 
identity over time"82 such that "I myself[ .. . ] become changed ifl 'cancel' my decisions 
or repudiate my deeds" (CM 34). Nevertheless, the ego remains something in addition to 
these properties as something which can, for example, develop and reflect upon them. 
While "habitual properties" (CM 28) perhaps form the core of personality or character, 
they do not form the core of the transcendental ego. What is, therefore, more fundamental 
for the transcendental ego's self-explication is the ego's identification with the stream as 
a system of ordered events wherein "all the life-processes belonging to the ego[ . . . ] must 
present themselves" (CM 42). 
Husser! develops and advances Hume's discovery that a central activity of the self 
is the integration of time, i.e., that a temporal aggregation of parts is constitutive of the 
self. Hume recognized that a key characteristic of human nature is our awareness that 
mental events or perceptions are always situated in a temporal series or experienced 
succession. In Husser!, this discovery culminates in a more comprehensive analysis of 
lived time, of time as a form, necessary precondition and determining limit of the mind's 
82 John J. Drummond, Historical Dictionary of Husser! :S Philosophy (Lanhan, Maryland: The Scarecrow 
Press, 2008), 205. 
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acts and objects. 83 But, in Husserl 's view, the self is not merely an aggregate oftime 
slices or temporal points, or indeed even an aggregate of full-blooded events where the 
distinguishing qualitative content of each event is taken into account. Instead, (and here 
he differs from Hume) Husserl holds the self to contain a part that stands outside of time. 
This pre-temporal part, i.e., functioning consciousness, is responsible for and independent 
ofthe temporal order in which the self's acts and objects are situated. The self is thus 
both qualitatively and temporally extended (if not pre-temporally extended as well). As 
such, the characterization of the self as a mere aggregation of time, a stream of events or 
a synthesis oftemporality is overly simplistic.84 I shall examine Husserl's account ofthe 
ego's pre-temporal functioning consciousness in further detail in Part IV. There are two 
remaining characterizations to be considered: the self as eidetic ego and as monad. 
Husser I claims that "there extends through all the particular data of actual and 
possible self-experience [ .. . ] a universal apodictically experienceable structure of the 
ego" (CM 28). This universal structure, which Husserl calls the eidos ego, is illuminated 
by what he calls eidetic phenomenology or the phenomenological investigation of 
experience insofar as every experience reveals itself to be an experience of a certain type 
or eidos. In this investigation, each experience is grasped as but one of a number of 
83 For a detailed analysis of the connections between Hume and Husser! on the issue of the self' s 
experience of temporal order, see Louis N. Sandowsky, "Hume and Husser! : The Problem of the Continuity 
or Temporalization of Consciousness," International Philosophical Quarterly , Pt I, 181 (2006): 59-74. 
84 Indeed, the self's experience of spatial objects destabilizes any characterization of the self as an 
exclusively temporal (i.e., non-spatial) synthesis. 
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possible experiences of the same eidos. Thus the inquiry moves from the de facto to the 
de jure, 85 from the concrete particular to the structure or set of all possible variations. 
Husserl argues that in the eidetic approach to self-experience the "de facto 
transcendental ego and particular data given in transcendental experience of the ego have 
the significance merely of examples of pure possibilities" (CM 73). Eidetic 
phenomenology thus reveals modes of self-constitution that "exist as possibilities for me" 
(CM 75) and are alternatives to the self-constitution presented in the ego's concrete life-
stream. In grasping these possibilities, the ego also grasps the eidos or structure from 
which these possibilities emanate. Thus the ego demonstrates its ability to "go beyond 
itself into its implicit horizons,"86 and it thereby "explores the universal a priori without 
which neither I nor any transcendental ego whatever is 'imaginable"' (CM 72). In 
performing eidetic phenomenology, I attempt "imaginative variations on my own life."87 
Each time I find a structure in myself which resists all conceivable variation,88 I grasp 
another part of the eidos ego. 
Husserl is clear, however, that the eidos ego is not a window onto any existential 
Other or transcendent being. As Ricoeur puts it, "I have no access to the plural through 
the universal. "89 As such, the discovery of the eidos ego does not entail the de facto ego's 
participation in a transcendent Platonic realm of Ideas, or even in an intersubjective 
85 Rudolf Bernet, I so Kern and Eduard Marbach, An Introduction to Husser/ian Phenomenology (Evanston, 
Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1993), 79. 
86 Paul Ricoeur, Husser/: An Analysis of His Phenomenology, trans. Edward G. Ballard and Lester E . 
Embree (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 2007), 113. 
87 Ibid., 92. 
88 Eidetic phenomenology is premised upon what Husser! calls "a new universal concept of possibility [i.e., 
that of] mere imaginableness" (CM 58). 
89 Paul Ricoeur, Husser/: An Analysis of His Phenomenology, trans. Edward G. Ballard and Lester E. 
Embree (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 2007), 92. 
60 
community which has the eidos ego as the form of all its members. Rather, the eidos ego 
is a product of the self, informed by the selfs particular efforts to uncover it and is 
derived from the self's de facto constitution. Thus "eidetic self-variation" (CM 136) is 
but one mode of the self-explication of the de facto transcendental ego and provides only 
a partial understanding of the latter. 
In Husserl's final characterization, the ego is conceived as a monad, i.e. , as the 
totality of all actual and possible acts, objects and times. He claims: 
The monadically concrete ego includes also the whole of actual 
and potential conscious life, [and thus] the problem of 
explicating this monadic ego phenomenologically[ ... ] must 
include all constitutional problems without exception. 
Consequently the phenomenology of this self-constitution 
coincides with phenomenology as a whole (CM 68) 
The monad is the view of the ego as both the pure or absolute consciousness qua 
"constitutor of all reality"90 and as the absolute concretum or sum of all constitutions. As 
the universal container of all acts and objects, the ego as monad implies "the total 
triumph of interiority over exteriority and of the transcendental over the transcendent."91 
Although the ego as monad, by definition, 'contains everything' we nevertheless have 
only an inadequate grasp of what it contains. To explore the center ofthis monad, i.e., the 
part of the self about which our knowledge is least adequate, we must consider Husserl's 
90 Ibid., 52. 
9 1 Ibid., 107. 
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theory of inner time-consciousness, a theory that is understood to be "among the most 
important and difficult"92 in his phenomenology. 
PART IV. INNER TIME-CONSCIOUSNESS AND SELF-AWARENESS 
Husser! distinguishes three "layers or levels oftemporality: the objective time of 
the appearing objects, the subjective, immanent, or pre-empirical time of the acts and 
experiences, and finally, the absolute pre-phenomenal flow of inner time-constituting 
consciousness. "93 Each layer is founded on those beneath except the layer of inner time-
consciousness which is itself absolute and foundational. Husserl claims that this lowest 
level is a "realm of a Heraclitean flux" (CM 49). At this lowest level of temporality, 
Husserl discovers a principle of functioning consciousness, i.e., a principle that serves as 
the ultimate origin and end of the intentionality issuing forth toward and reflecting from 
objects. The ego at this level experiences itself as "the point through which time streams 
and in which its content-laden moments appear to well up as present and actual"94 and as 
a "point of actuality[ ... ] from which springs the now."95 Conceived in this way, 
92 Dan Zahavi, "Inner Time-Consciousness and Pre-reflective Self-awareness," The New Husser/: A 
Critical Reader, ed. Donn Welton (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2003), 164. 
93 Ibid., 168. 
94 James R. Mensch, "Freedom and Selthood," Husser/ Studies, No. 14 ( 1997): 4 7. 
95 RichardT. Murphy, Hume and Husser/: Towards Radical Subjectivism (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 1980), 103. 
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functioning consciousness is "not itself temporal but [ .. . ] is self-temporalizing,"96 i.e., it 
is a pre-temporal condition for the possibility of the selfs experience of the higher 
temporal levels. 
Husser! holds functioning consciousness to be the central principle in the life of 
the ego and the pre-condition for the ego's other aspects. Since he regards functioning 
consciousness to be foundational , he seeks to disclose it "ever more fully and concretely 
[but] without transforming this disclosure into a thematic display claiming total reflective 
clarity.'m Thus he never presents functioning consciousness as a proper object of 
reflection which in turn can be analysed and disassembled into still more fundamental 
pre-functioning or pre-conscious parts. He limits the disclosure of functioning 
consciousness by constraining the ego's ability to reflect upon itself, i.e., by limiting the 
selfs self-awareness. 
Husser! sought to avoid presenting self-awareness either as an "instantaneous [or] 
non-temporal"98 revelation of the self to itself or as a "completely fractured [i.e., 
episodic] time-consciousness, which makes both consciousness of the present, and of the 
unity of the stream unintelligible."99 His solution is to articulate both a pre-reflective (i.e., 
instantaneous) and a reflective (i.e., episodic) variety of self-awareness. 
The first of these, pre-reflective self-awareness (hereafter PRSA), is the ultimate 
structure underlying "how consciousness experiences itself, how it is given to itself, how 
96 John J. Drummond, Historical Dictionary of Husser/ 's Philosophy (Lanhan, Maryland: The Scarecrow 
Press, 2008), 200. 
97 RichardT. Murphy, Hume and Husser/: Towards Radical Subjectivism (The Hague: Martinus Nijhotf 
Publishers, 1980), 139. 
98 Dan Zahavi, "Inner Time-Consciousness and Pre-reflective Self-awareness," The New Husser/: A 
Critical Reader, ed. Donn Welton (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2003), I 73 . 
99 fbid. 
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it manifests itself."100 PRSA, as pre-reflective, does not objectify the self as a reflective 
object against a horizon. Rather, the self is "immediately given" to itself in a pre-
temporal or "ecstatic unity." 101 PRSA is primary and always present in every conscious 
act and informs every act not as an added quality but as the act's implicit mode. 102 PRSA 
is not an act of consciousness, it is not "initiated, regulated, or controlled by the ego."103 
Rather, it is a structure to which all conscious acts conform. Furthermore, PRSA is not 
itself founded on another type of self-awareness but is that upon which the other type of 
self-awareness, i.e., reflective self-awareness, is founded. 
According to Ricoeur, Husser! holds that PRSA facilitates an awareness ofthe 
self that "conceals no hidden internal domain [and] is absolutely simple and lies entirely 
open."104 The PRSA presentation ofthe self is absolutely simple and cannot be unfolded 
or explored because it is strikingly vacuous in content: Husser! explicitly denies that 
PRSA yields any knowledge ofthe self. Despite the ego's possession ofPRSA, 
functioning consciousness as "the streaming flowing present remains [for the ego] an 
enigma." 105 
The second type of self-awareness Husser! identifies, i.e., reflective self 
awareness (hereafter RSA), takes place as a voluntary, occasional and explicit act 
wherein the self is objectified. RSA can yield knowledge when its presentation of the self 
100 Ibid., 160. 
10 1 Ibid., 173. 
102 Ibid., 160. 
103 Ibid., 172. 
104 Paul Ricoeur, Husser!: An Analysis of His Phenomenology, trans. Edward G. Ballard and Lester E. 
Embree (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 2007), 54. 
105 RichardT. Murphy, Hume and Husser/: Towards Radical Subjectivism (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 1980), 126. 
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as a horizoned reflective object is methodically unfolded. RSA does not produce 
awareness of the self but is founded upon it. As Schmid puts it, "I'm not aware of myself 
because of self-reflection, but I can reflect upon myself because of (pre-reflective] self-
awareness [as] a precondition of reflection." 106 
In Husserl's view, RSA or "reflection on the self is reflecting on life,"107 on the 
selfs life-stream and the manifold of particular temporally situated acts and objects 
therein. Thus RSA can yield a wide array of discoveries, such as the Cartesian discovery 
that "I have previously existed for some time."108 But all discoveries founded in RSA are 
informed by a kind of temporal self-distancing. As Mensch puts it, "fixed as I am in the 
temporal center, I always experience an inner distance between the self I presently am 
and the selfthat I can objectively grasp [because] the objective self, is already fixed in 
departing time."109 In short, every act ofRSA "comes always too late to catch the subject 
in the act of performing." 110 This temporal self-distancing produces a second splitting of 
the ego in which the "'Object-Ego' and 'Subject-Ego' step apart [such that] the living and 
performing ego itself remains completely inaccessible." 11 1 What RSA facilitates then, is 
not a "monologue of the ego, but[ ... ] a 'dialogue with another."112 
106 Hans Bernhard Schmid, "Apodictic Evidence," Husser! Studies, Vol. 7 (2001): 229. 
107 Paul Ricoeur, Husser!: An Analysis of His Phenomenology, trans. Edward G. Ballard and Lester E. 
Embree (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 2007), 93. 
108 Rene Descartes, Meditations, Objections and Replies, ed. Roger Ariew and Donald Cress (Indianapolis: 
Hackett, 2006), 25. 
109 James R. Mensch, "Freedom and Selthood," Husser! Studies, No. 14 (1997): 48. 




In Husserl's view, when I objectify or "thematize myself in a reflection, the very 
act ofthematization remains unthematic" 113 because "reflection always grasps an object, 
[but] not the source itself which is at work in it; and yet it inevitably points to just such a 
source."
114 RSA is incomplete insofar as it fails to draw itself, i.e., the RSA act, into 
thematic view and insofar as it never affords a view of functioning consciousness as the 
origin of the RSA act. Since it arises out of deeper structures within the ego, RSA is 
"only a prominence within a total consciousness always presupposed as unitary" (CM 
43). Ricoeur summarizes the issue as follows: 
There is an ego which lives in every constituting consciousness, 
but no word can be said about it, [it] cannot become the object of 
inquiry; it cannot be 'thematized.' One can only come upon its 
'ways of relating itselfto [objects].[ ... ] There is then, at the 
most, a phenomenology of the how of the ego, although there is 
none ofthe quid ofthe ego. 115 
Functioning consciousness and the objectified self are essentially 
incommensurable, and Husser! understood them as such: "Husser! does not dream of a 
fusion of the transcendental and the objective within an ambiguous experience which 
113 Dan Zahavi, "Inner Time-Consciousness and Pre-reflective Self-awareness," The New Husser/: A 
Critical Reader, ed. Donn Welton (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2003), 161. 
114 Jan Pato~ka and James Dodd, An Introduction to Husser/'s Phenomenology, (USA: Carus Publishing 
Company, 1996), 124. The emphasis is mine. 
115 Paul Ricoeur, Husser!: An Analysis of His Phenomenology, trans. Edward G. Ballard and Lester E. 
Embree (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 2007), 150. 
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somehow holds them in an irresolvable suspension."116 While the self can reflect upon 
itself and explicate some of its content, the explication always centers on the selfs acts, 
objects and the intentional exchanges by virtue of which those acts and objects have 
meaning. The self cannot step outside of functioning consciousness to analyse the way in 
which the latter structures the self. Phenomenology, in short, offers an account of the 
selfs activity in founding objects but no account ofthe foundation of this activity. 
Functioning consciousness can only "stop or initiate reflection," 11 7 it cannot be reflected 
upon and thus remains an anonymous "blind spot in the core of subjectivity."118 It is a 
thing in itself to itself and the last remaining transcendent entity ever eluding the 
transcendental system or, put differently, the entity which holds the entire 
phenomenological enterprise as transcendent in relation to it. 
CONCLUSION 
In a closing passage of Cartesian Meditations, Husser! claims that his 
phenomenology provides "the Delphic motto, 'Know thyself!' [with] a new signification" 
(CM 157). In this chapter, I have sought to clarify the grounds for this claim and to 
analyse phenomenology's reply to Husserl's own iconic question (also posed in 
116 Ibid., 68. 
117 Ibid., 54. 
118 Dan Zahavi, "Inner Time-Consciousness and Pre-reflective Self-awareness," The New Husser/: A 
Critical Reader, ed. Donn Welton (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2003), 171-1 72. 
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Cartesian Meditations), i.e., the question of, "How far can the transcendental ego be 
deceived about himself?" (CM 23). 
In Husserl's phenomenology, the self's awareness of itself is essential because, he 
claims, "only if my experiencing of my transcendental self is apodictic can it serve as 
ground and basis for apodictic judgments" (CM 22). For Husserl, PRSA provides this 
apodictic experience of the transcendental self. But the self in PRSA is empty, inscrutable 
and vacuous: essentially, it is incapable of being supported by analysis or of supporting 
analysis. Perhaps, as Ricoeur claims, Husserl would regard the idea that functioning 
consciousness could perceive itself and unfold its own hidden structure to be "monstrous, 
something like an empiricism of the transcendental."119 Nevertheless, the lack of some 
such exegesis of functioning consciousness casts doubt upon the claim that the self is an 
intelligible foundation for science and phenomenology. Perhaps, as Wittgenstein claims, 
explanation (or, in Husserl's case, description) has to stop somewhere and Husserl selects 
functioning consciousness as the place at which phenomenological description must end. 
But stopping here renders the core of his concept of the self groundless, empty and 
incapable of defending science or philosophy against sceptical attack. Instead of detailing 
the process by which the self comes to be aware of itself, Husser! seems to have 
presupposed that the self always already is self-aware. His account of PRSA offers no 
concrete explication of what self-awareness consists in or of how the self perceives itself 
at the level of functioning consciousness. 
119 Paul Ricoeur, Husser/: An Analysis of His Phenomenology, trans. Edward G. Ballard and Lester E. 
Embree (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 2007), 90. 
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Husserl's account ofPRSA seems to affirm the conclusion derived from one of 
Hume's lesser known thought experiments. According to Hume, the though experiment 
shows that self-awareness must be either omnipresent in all our perceptions or never 
present in any of them. Hume draws his thought experiment as follows: 
Suppose the mind to be reduc'd [and] to have only one 
perception, as of thirst or hunger. Consider it in that situation. Do 
you conceive any thing but merely that perception? Have you 
any notion of self or substance? If not, the addition of other 
. . h . 120 perceptiOns can never g1ve you t at not10n. 
Self-awareness, for Hume and Husserl, cannot be produced or built up through an 
addition or combination of acts that are not already informed by self-awareness. 
Although Hume's atomism precluded him from allowing any complex self-awareness at 
the level of simple sense experience, it would not have precluded the absolutely simple 
PRSA advanced by Husser!. Hume would be likely to claim, however, that, as absolutely 
simple, PRSA is absolutely empty and only apodictic precisely in virtue of its vacuity. 
Both Hume and Husserl hold that the self as a whole is never objectified in reflection. 
Husserl argues that reflection on the self is possible but claims that the self never has 
more than an inadequate or non-comprehensive understanding of itself. 
120 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge, revised by P.H. Nidditch, 2"d ed. 
(Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1978), 634. 
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CONCLUSION 
In this conclusion, I shall examine the many striking similarities and central 
differences that obtain between the theories of the self forwarded by Hume and Husser!. I 
argue that although their similarities are derived from a variety of shared commitments, 
the key disagreements between the two derive from their differing responses to the 
question of whether ordinary perception entails the existence of a percipient or perceiving 
subject. I argue that while their responses differ in letter, their actual positions are similar 
because both Hurne and Husser! appeal to a conception of the percipient and both fail to 
explicate sufficiently this conception. Finally, I argue that this deficiency which faces 
both theories would be mitigated or remedied if Hurne and Husser! were to accept the 
specific model of self-perception that is implicitly illuminated, although foreclosed in 
general terms, in Burne's bundle theory. I shall begin with an analysis of the ways in 
which the two theories agree. 
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Hume and Husser! tend, in general, to treat the self and the mind as one and the 
same entity. 121 They both hold this entity to be not only the agent but also the means of 
all possible inquiry. It is their shared conviction that regardless of whether an inquiry 
aims for science or art and of whether it advances by a collaborative or solipsistic effort, 
the self, as the means of the inquiry, will condition the inquiry in much the same way as 
the physical properties of a piano will condition the audible qualities of the notes played 
on that piano. Or, put differently, they hold that the self acts as an idiosyncratic filter or 
'cognitive architecture' through which the execution, deliberation and conclusion of all 
inquiry must pass. 122 
Further, Hume and Husser! hold that in the inquiry into the nature of the self, a 
peculiar confluence occurs such that the self is at once the agent, the means and the end 
toward which the inquiry aims. Although both philosophers aim to discover a strong 
foundation for philosophy and for the sciences, in the case of each this foundation turns 
12 1 Although in Books II and lii of the Treatise Hume presents the self as an object of moral deliberation, 
he always conceives of the self as the (mental) origin of such deliberation. Similarly, Husserl's efforts to 
present the self in an ethical, intersubjective light cash out in an underscoring of the self's primacy as the 
res cogitans, i.e., thinking thing or mind, that is presupposed by and responsible for all such ethical 
considerations. 
122 There appears to be some tension on this point inHume. In the Treatise he explicitly emphasizes human 
nature, rather than the self, as that which conditions all understanding. But this emphasis is misplaced. 
H ume holds that the study of human nature proceeds as the self observes the regularities with which its 
own mental events come to be. On the basis ofthese observations, the self infers laws ofhuman nature, i.e., 
regularities held to obtain in all selves that are tokens of the type, 'human.' But, in accordance with his 
scepticism, Hume accepts that inferences about other selves are always dubious and that the self cannot 
know whether or in what ways other selves differ from the self. Indeed, the self cannot even know whether 
one of the regularities it finds within itself is derived from human nature or whether that regularity is 
idiosyncratic and peculiar to their person. As such, the Other may observe different regularities and form 
different, but no less empirical, inferences about human nature. On this issue, Hume claims, "all I can 
allow him is, that he may be in the right as well as I, and that we are essentially different in this particular" 
(David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge, revised by P.H. Nidditch, 2"d ed. 
(Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1978), 252). Thus it seems to be Hume's true position that the self, as a 
collection of regularities that are ultimately unknowable in origin, is that which conditions all possible 
inquiry. 
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out to be a synonym for the self or for the central features thereof. Just as Hume presents 
the self as the origin of the causal reasoning that is presupposed by Newtonian science, 
Husserl presents the self as the principle underlying the observer-observed dichotomy 
that is central to modern scientific practice. Thus the aim to know the self and the aim to 
found the sciences become hardly distinguishable. 
A key variable which is conspicuous in having not already been determined in 
advance by the nature of the inquiry into the self is the method by which the inquiry will 
proceed. Despite their differences, Hume and Husserl agree on several important points 
of method. Both adopt an idealist, solipsistic (at least initially), anti-metaphysical and 
anti-rationalist approach that utilizes inference based upon observation and proceeds from 
a de facto to a de jure understanding of the self. They also agree on several conclusions 
reached. For example, both hold the self to be a complex entity and one that is in some 
sense contingent on what it thinks. And, most fundamentally, both hold the self to be not 
only epistemically windowless, or unable in general to perceive other selves, but also to 
be epistemically mirrorless, or unable in general to perceive itself. I shall now explain 
each of these points of agreement in detail. 
Hume and Husserl are distrustful of any metaphysical speculation into the self or 
into any supposed foundation thereof. In the case of Hume, all legitimate inquiry into 
human nature must observe empirical, anti-metaphysical constraints. For Husserl, the 
epoche suspends metaphysics and explanation generally and retains only 
phenomenological description. Both reject the use of tautologies and axioms as a means 
by which to prove the existence or reveal the nature of the self. Neither would accept, for 
72 
example, that the existence of a percipient can be derived from the existence of a 
perception. Husserl's epoche and Hume's empiricism are designed to undercut such 
rationalist tendencies. They proceed, instead, in a piecemeal fashion by carefully crafting 
general inferences that correspond to the particulars of observed experience. 
Both philosophers subscribe to a variety of idealism that approaches objects 
endogenously or exclusively insofar as they arise within the selfs structures and 
experience. In Husserl's view, objects have meaning, existence and veracity only in 
relation to the self that intends these values. For Hume, objects can be known only in the 
context of the selfs perceptions and not as they might be in other contexts, e.g., in 
themselves. As a further consequence of this idealism, Hume and Husser! tend to present 
other selves in an anti-realist light, i.e., as non-egos or mere objects reified in perception, 
and they approach the actual existence, constitution and life of other selves as matters 
that transcend the selfs experience and, thus, remain forever unknowable. 123 
123 I do not wish to put too fine a point on this issue because there is, arguably, some ambiguity in Hume 
and Husser( about whether the views they present are, in the end, solipsist. While it is not a central aim of 
this thesis to decide the issue in a definitive manner, it remains the case that the solipsist tendency in Hume 
and Husser( powerfully affects the ultimate determinations they place on the self. The tendency culminates 
in their shared conception of the self as a discrete entity. Neither Hume nor Husser I are prepared to accept a 
naive realist view of the self's awareness of others as an awareness arising out ofthe self's interaction with 
independent beings that exist in an external world. Their philosophies scorch the earth upon which such a 
retreat to realism might have, in different circumstances, been viable. Husser( joins Hume in holding the 
realist claim for the existence of self-independent entities to be 'nonsense ' (CM 84). If knowledge of other 
selves is possible for Hume and Husserl, then such knowledge must be pursued through general inferences 
(Hume) or eidetic variations (Husserl) based upon the selfs own constitution, i.e., upon the perceptive parts 
constitutive of the self. To grasp others, and to determine the accuracy of this grasp, the self can only 
consult itself. It is in this sense, if not in a more final or absolute one, that the self is, in the theories of 
Hume and Husser(, "windowless" or, broadly speaking, solipsist. 
Husserl ' s views on this issue, however, are especially nuanced. As discussed above, he holds the self to 
be the absolute constitutor and absolute concretum of all reality, the monadic center of intentionality 
through which alone objects are 'sent forth' and enter consciousness as meaningful. To deny the self this 
absolute status is to undercut the central principle of Husserlian phenomenology. While subsequent 
phenomenological circles often work in this vein, the history of phenomenology is, as Ricoeur rightly puts 
it, "the history ofHusserlian heresies" (Paul Ricoeur, A ! 'ecole de Ia Phenomenology, (Paris: Vrin, 1987), 
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Despite their solipsistic approach, Hume and Husser! seek a universal model of 
the self, i.e., a model that accounts for the structures informing all selves and not only 
those that inform the self of David Hume or of Edmund Husser!. They hold the concrete 
de facto self to be the sole, if perhaps idiosyncratic, lens through which the de jure self, 
the eidos ego or the laws of human nature, can be examined. They also agree in viewing 
this movement, from the de facto to the de jure, as in some sense an epistemic 
abstraction. Hume holds all claims on the nature of other minds to be dubious. Husser! 
likewise insists that the eidos ego, i.e., the selfs grasp ofthe universal structures that 
inform all possible selves, is not a window or epistemically-valid route by which the lives 
of others, or the world as it is experienced by others, can be accessed. In this sense as 
well, both regard the self to be windowless. 
The critical and guiding role ofthe meditating ego in Husserl ' s epoche and of the 
first person 'I' inHume's scepticism broadly suggests a Cartesian conception of the self 
9). However, there is an extent to which the seed of these heresies is already present in Husser I. In his 
treatment of other selves, Husser( attempts to qualify or retract the selfs absolute status. He adopts a kind 
of pluralism, claiming that the self always encounters the world, and the other selves situated within it, not 
as mere projections of the ego, i.e., as objects constituted exclusively in and through the selrs intentional 
acts. Instead, the self is always presented with a world that is shared, co-constituted or co-intended by 
others. It seems that Husser I qualifies the selrs absolute status in order to avoid the conclusion of absolute 
solipsism. As Scheler puts it, "if the world [ ... ] is something other than the content of experience of 
individual egos, no ego[ ... ] can be the condition ofthe world. Conversely, every assumption of an 
egological condition of the world and its givenness necessarily leads to solipsism" (Max Scheler, 
Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values, trans. M. Frings and R. Funk (Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press, 1973), 379). The improbable balancing act for Husserl is to uphold the 
conception of the self as absolute monad while also allowing other selves and the world to transcend the 
way in which they are intended, constituted and contained with in the self as monad. It is in this context that 
Husserl outlines his theory of the selrs meaning-laden encounter with what he calls an analogizing 
appresentation of the Other (hereafter, AAO). It is outside the specific aim of this thesis to analyse 
Husserl's theory of the AAO in detail. It is noteworthy, however, that Husserl 's efforts to escape solipsism 
through the selrs encounter with the AAO are, at the least, problematic. If the self alone bestows all 
objects, including the AAO, with their meaning, then it does not matter what meaning the phenomenologist 
interprets the AAO to have because the AAO cannot, in any case, be plausibly viewed as genuine objective 
evidence for the independent or transcendent existence of any other self. However, as stated above, 
Husserl's theory of self-other relations is a topic for future work. 
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as a self-responsible and unified center of contemplative activity, i.e., a free and rational 
center of bracketing, deciding, doubting, etc. But the theories advanced by Hurne and 
Husserl draw upon a tradition that is rooted in Plato, Aristotle, the ancient atomists and 
several other pre-Socratics. According to this tradition, the self or soul is a complex of 
mereologically-bound but distinguishable parts. For Hurne and Husser!, questions about 
the nature of the selfs parts, their coming together, their relations with one another and 
with the self as a whole are central. 124 
Hurne and Husserl also share in their rejection of Descartes' doctrine that 
although it is essential that the self thinks, the self is not contingent upon what it thinks, 
i.e., that the self, as a whole, is essentially independent and unaffected by any change or 
succession among its own acts and objects of thought. Instead, they claim that acts and 
objects enter into the constitution of the self and that the self is at least to some extent 
contingent upon these parts. For Husser!, the constitution of acts and objects is 
simultaneously a constitution of the self. For Hume, the self is the bundle of perceptions 
that bundles all encountered perceptions into itself. Husser!, however, holds the self to be 
something in addition to its objects, i.e., the self is also an independent functioning 
consciousness, whereas Hume denies any such additional content in the self. Despite this 
difference, both hold that the self cannot pursue itself as an independent object of inquiry 
in an important sense. If in seeking to know itself the self encounters new perceptions, 
124 On the surface, Hume appears to reject a hierarchy of parts in the self whereas Husser! appears to accept 
one insofar as the latter allows that functioning consciousness would a lone continue to exist even if all the 
self's acts and objects ceased to be. But Hume's appeal to an active aspect of the self, if it does not imply a 
hierarchy in the self, at the very least diminishes the ease with which he can reject one. As I shall argue 
below, Husser!, for his part, never adequately explains functioning consciousness. Thus any hierarchy 
based upon this principle would seem ill-founded if not unintelligible. 
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then the self both as the seeker and as the thing sought will undergo some change as a 
result of those perceptions. The self is like a dishonest archer who steps ahead of the 
shooting line only to find that her target has also moved and, moreover, that it has moved 
the same distance and in the same direction as she. 
Hume and Husser! raise doubts over the extent to which the self can be reflected 
upon. It is true that both allow that the self can know itself to the extent that it can grasp 
the acts and objects, i.e., the parts, that successively enter into its constitution. But, for 
both, the self can neither grasp all its parts at once nor grasp its own essence. For Hume, 
the self contains a number of parts so great that no single perception can represent all of 
them together at once. Similarly, for Husser!, the totality of acts and objects which 
collectively constitute a life-stream are too broad and diverse to be grasped as the object 
of a single reflective act in that stream. 125 The self cannot grasp its own essence, in 
Burne's view, because it has no such essence. For Husser!, the selfs essence, i.e., 
functioning consciousness, cannot be grasped because it extends beyond every act of 
reflection as the pre-temporal condition for that act and as origin of the process which 
brings that act into being. 
Husserl's conception of functioning consciousness is analogous to Burne's 
conception of the self as a theatre in which only mental events and the parts thereof can 
be perceived. For Hume, we can know nothing of the nature of the theatre in addition to 
or apart from these events. Although Husser! is less explicit, the fact is that his 
125 In Ideas, Husser! claims that the totality of the selfs acts can never be thematized in a single reflection 
(Edmund Husser! , Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, 
First Book, trans. F. Kersten (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1983), 197). 
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phenomenological explication of the self centers increasingly upon the selfs objects and 
acts and never provides any adequate explication of what functioning consciousness is as 
a principle in itself. In short, little if anything meaningful can be said and nothing 
whatever can be known of functioning consciousness. In this respect, functioning 
consciousness and Burne' s view of the self as an unknowable theatre are equivalent. 
The key difference between the theories of the self forwarded by Hume and 
Husser! is the latter's recognition and the former' s failure to acknowledge that in their 
own philosophies the term 'perception' is used in a way that implicates both a process of 
perceiving and a thing perceived. Husser! accepts this double meaning by analysing 
perceptions in terms of a 'cogito' and a ' cogitatum' as well as a ' noesis' and a 'noema.' 
He holds consciousness to be relational and accepts the Kantian framework in which the 
intending ego and its intended objects figure as "two inseparable poles of a single· 
dynamic process ofrepresentation."126 The bundle theory appears to have an advantage in 
terms of eloquence or economy insofar as, for Hume, there is no formal ego in addition to 
the streaming matter of perception. But this eloquence is illusory and only possible 
because Hume fails to acknowledge or explicate his appeal, made throughout the 
Treatise, to the selfs active bundling aspect. While Husser! acknowledges a perception-
percipient distinction and a meditating ego as foundational , he fails to explicate the 
percipient at the level of either functioning consciousness or the meditating ego. Indeed, 
the revelation of functioning consciousness as empty or inscrutable appears to be 
triggered by Husser!' s early acceptance of a bare or essentially vacuous notion of the 
126 Jay F. Rosenberg, The Thinking Self(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1986), 6. 
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meditating ego. The two principles are closely linked, if not one and the same. I conclude 
that both philosophers appeal to a conception of the self, i.e., to a model of the crucial 
term in their philosophies, without adequately explicating this conception. 
Thus neither Hume nor Husserl offer a theory of the self that is, in present 
condition, tenable. Nevertheless, both are compatible with and best understood in light of 
the particular model of self-perception outlined in Chapter 1. According to this model, 
self-perception occurs whenever the self perceives any one of its parts- i.e., whenever it 
perceives anything. This self-perception can become thematic or understood to be a case 
of self-perception if, as the self perceives some part of itself, the self also perceives (i) 
that the part which it perceives is a part of a passive or bundled aspect, (ii) that the 
perceiving is a part or a function of an active bundling aspect, and (iii) that the active 
aspect's epistemic access to the parts of the passive aspect, i.e., the former' s ability to 
grasp or reflect upon the parts of the later, implies that the two aspects cannot be discrete 
with respect to one another. The fact that the active aspect appears incapable of 
perceiving anything which is not a part of its passive aspect suggests that the two aspects 
subsist in one and the same discrete entity. 
Hume and Husserl already agree that the self always perceives itself to the extent 
that it always perceives one of its parts. The aforementioned model of self-perception 
allows us to press this agreement a step further. The model clarifies that the self realizes 
the most comprehensive and concrete perception it can have of itself when it perceives its 
own inability to perceive anything but itself, i.e. , when it perceives that its own 
windowlessness is, if not derived from, at least ensured by its possession of, and its 
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immutable fixation upon, a mirror in which some part of itself is always reflected. In 
short, the self perceives itself most completely when it perceives itself to be a discrete or 
exclusively self-perceiving entity. 
The question of how the active and passive aspects are constitutive of a discrete 
and unified self is a topic for future research. However, Hume seems to point towards 
startling grounds for the selfs unity. His analysis suggests that each aspect, like each 
actor in the theatre of the mind, is what it is only in relation to the changes, endurances 
and other properties exhibited by the other. On this view, the differing ontological natures 
of the aspects are not determined by a differing and immutable essence peculiar to each. 
Rather, the nature of each aspect determines and is determined by the nature of the other 
aspect; and it is through this relation of co-dependency and co-determination that the 
aspects are folded into a real and discrete unity. Since the qualitative difference between 
the two aspects is determined exclusively through their pre-existing and ongoing 
connection with one another, efforts to separate the aspects are a species of abstraction. 
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